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DEGREES OF DEFERENCE: APPLYING VS.
ADOPTING ANOTHER SOVEREIGN’S LAW
Kevin M. Clermont †
Familiar to all Federal Courts enthusiasts is the Erie dis-
tinction between federal actors’ obligatory application of state
law and their voluntary adoption of state law as federal law.
This Article’s thesis is that this significant distinction holds in
all other situations where a sovereign employs another’s law:
not only in the analogous reverse-Erie resolution of federal
law’s constraint on state actors, but also in the horizontal
choice-of-law setting and even in connection with the status of
international law.
Application and adoption are different avenues by which
to approach a pluralist world.  Application involves the recog-
nition of the other sovereign’s law properly governing by its
own force, while adoption follows from voluntary consultation
of the other’s law while formulating the local rule of decision in
pursuit of fairness, convenience, or other local policies.  The
applying/adopting distinction can be difficult to draw, but
draw it we must because many binary practical consequences
turn on it.  Those consequences range beyond the federalist
implications for federal and state courts to the modifiability of
the sovereign’s law and the availability of original and appel-
late jurisdiction in the local courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Oklahoma may try to stop Shari’a from sweeping down the
plain, but American legal systems cannot build a wall that will
block all the waves of immigrating law.1  Legal actors must
handle a fair amount of law backed by a sovereign other than
their own.
1 See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir. 2012) (enjoining
Oklahoma’s attempt to amend the state constitution thus: “The courts shall not
look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures.  Specifically, the courts
shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.”) (emphasis omitted); infra
note 209. R
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This Article’s concern is the employment, by any sort of
public or private legal actor involved in lawmaking or law ap-
plying, of another sovereign’s law to provide the rule of deci-
sion.2  Because the most familiar setting is a court’s use of
such law, examples drawn from the judicial setting are the
easiest to comprehend.  For courts, examples of this employ-
ment fall into at least four categories of setting: (1) a federal
court frequently wields state law;3 (2) a state court frequently
defers to federal law;4 (3) American courts may resort to foreign
law by horizontal choice of law, where “foreign” in this particu-
lar context refers to the law of a U.S. state or another country;5
and (4) American courts may look to international law.6
In the first of those four settings, federal courts have stead-
ily distinguished between two methods of reference to state
law.7  First, a certain state’s law can apply “of its own force” in
federal court, under the command of the Erie doctrine.8  Al-
though admittedly the state law so applies “of its own force”
only because federal law says it must apply, that federal com-
mand exists as a result of the states’ original consent to our
constitutional structure.9  Second, when federal law governs
but there is no extant federal law, the federal court may adopt
state law as federal common law.10  The state law then does not
in any sense apply of its own force, but instead the federal
court merely incorporates it by reference.11  It no longer is state
law, it becomes federal law.  The status of adoption carries with
2 For justification of the focus on rules of decision, in contrast to use of
foreign law as an interpretive guide or as a datum in a case, see infra text accom-
panying note 174. R
3 See infra notes 37–48 and accompanying text. R
4 See infra notes 136–65 and accompanying text. R
5 See infra Part III and accompanying text.
6 See infra Part IV and accompanying text.
7 See generally ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & DONALD THEODORE TRAUTMAN,
THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 1049–51 (1965) (discussing the two methods,
and using “supplementation” as the term for adoption of state law, as opposed to
“delineation” for application of state law).
8 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938), overruling Swift
v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of
Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 886 & n.16 (1986) (“In areas in which
federal courts lack power to create a federal rule of decision, state law is said to
operate ‘of its own force.’” (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.,
412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)).
9 See VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 7, at 1049–51 (“[T]he ultimate R
bounds of federal competence are established in the Constitution, but a wise
exercise of federal power often leads Congress or the courts to contain federal
power within more restrictive limits.”).
10 See id. at 1049–51, 1054–58.
11 See id. at 1050–51 (“In cases of optional supplementation by reference, a
federal rule is supplemented by a relevant rule of state law, but although the
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it all sorts of practical implications.12  The most obvious impli-
cations are that the federal court can let federal interests guide
which state’s law to adopt for the particular case and how
much of it to adopt.
Applying versus adopting is thus a recognized and basic
distinction in our Erie law, but I think that the distinction
between methods is of more general significance.  These two
methods are theoretically available in the other three settings
of judicial encounters with another sovereign’s law.13  A court
might apply it or adopt it.  Awareness of the differences between
the two methods could provide all sorts of practical lessons, not
only as to federalism but also as to conflict of laws and interna-
tional law.
The initial step in generalizing the distinction is to flesh out
the two methods.  Typically, a sovereign’s adoption would in-
volve a low commitment to the other sovereign’s law and hence
a high retained degree of control of the governing law.14  Appli-
cation would by contrast involve a high degree of commitment
and hence a low degree of retained control.  But as one seeks
the essential distinction, one will perceive that the true marker
is which sovereign is supplying the rule of decision—is it the
domestic sovereign or the foreign sovereign?
On the one hand, the domestic lawmaker might adopt the
other sovereign’s law as its own law.15  Adoption usually repre-
sents only the consultation of the other’s law while formulating
the sovereign’s own law.  Adoption could be static, adopting the
other’s law as it now is, or dynamic, adopting the law as the
other sovereign might change it in the future.16  Indeed, the
adopting sovereign could bind itself to follow slavishly the other
sovereign’s law.  The adopter could thereby make its adoption
look just like applied law.17  But it would still be adoption be-
cause the domestic sovereign is formulating its own law and
retains ultimately full control over its content.18  Thus, the
supplementary rules derive their content from state law, they are analytically
though covertly federal rules.”).
12 See infra notes 90–135 and accompanying text. R
13 See infra Parts II–IV.
14 See VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 7, at 1050–51, 1054–58. R
15 See id. at 1054–58.
16 As a matter of local validity, dynamic incorporation might raise some con-
cerns of sovereignty and delegation. See Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation
of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 110–12 (2008) (using the term “incorpora-
tion” to refer to the concept of “adoption” of another sovereign’s law).
17 See infra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. R
18 See VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 7, at 1050–51 (noting that, when R
distinguishing between adoption and application, “[t]he ultimate test that deter-
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static/dynamic difference or any other details of adoption are
not a concern for present purposes.  This Article’s concern is
with the general notion of adoption of nondomestic law as do-
mestic law, rather than the particular manner of adoption.
On the other hand, in other circumstances a domestic legal
actor might concede that another sovereign’s law applies.19
Application fundamentally differs from adoption, in that it re-
quires recognition that the other’s law has a claim actually to
govern.  That is, the subject of the verb changes, as does the
direction of the action: the other sovereign’s law might apply, or
the domestic sovereign might adopt another’s law.  That usage
follows from the two words’ meanings.  The word “apply” comes
from the Latin applica¯re, which meant to lay on or to impose;
the word “adopt” comes from the Latin adopta¯re, which meant
to choose for oneself or to take by choice.20
Application would result from some dictate, external (an-
other sovereign’s constitutional, statutory, or judicial com-
mand that is binding on the domestic sovereign) or internal (a
self-imposed choice-of-law rule deriving from domestic consti-
tutional, statutory, or judicial decision).21  An internal directive
does not really result in the other sovereign’s law applying ex
proprio vigore but rather represents a choice by domestic law to
treat the other’s law as if it were directly applicable.  It is thus
essentially a recognition of the status of the other’s law as
being at least co-equal.
This realization—that application may rest on an internal
decision—leads us sometimes to speak nontechnically of the
domestic sovereign choosing to apply another sovereign’s law.
More significantly, this realization could induce the counter-
argument that application to adoption constitutes a spectrum,
without any inherent difference between the poles.22  Applica-
tion might be just some strict form of adoption.  But any such
thought—that the difference between applying and adopting is
one of degree—runs up against the fact that, as we shall see,
big practical consequences turn on the binary distinction.23
The law thus forces distinguishing application from adoption.
mines which technique is being used is whether . . . supplementing rules could be
federally articulated or must be found in the relevant state law”).
19 See infra notes 37–48 and accompanying text. R
20 See THE BARNHART CONCISE DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 11, 33 (Robert K. Barn-
hart ed., 1995).
21 See infra notes 228–36 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Part III, subpart C.
23 See infra notes 90–135, 178–207, 241–73 and accompanying text. R
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One could certainly investigate the obvious distinction be-
tween external and internal directives.  But the different and
less obvious distinction between application and adoption
turns out to be much more instructive.  To explore and develop
the latter distinction, Part I will map out the solid ground for
distinguishing between application and adoption of state law
by federal actors such as the federal courts.  Part II will analo-
gize to application and adoption of federal law by state actors.
Part III will explain how American horizontal choice of law has
evolved from adoption to application of foreign law.  Part IV will
extend the distinction to the realm of international law, where
Americans have instead evolved from application to adoption.
Significantly, the last two subparts under international law tie
everything in the Article into a theme of pluralism and then
extend coverage to all nonsovereign law.
Outside the scope of this Article is the critical question of
when a sovereign should defer to another.  Each sovereign’s
law has a certain domain of authority.24  Sometimes the sover-
eign will look beyond its domain and defer to a competing sov-
ereign’s law, motivated by external directive, reciprocal self-
interest, or some sense of justice.25  However, this Article’s con-
cern is not with when to defer but how a sovereign can defer,
that is, by application or by adoption.26
To locate my subject jurisprudentially, I note that if H.L.A.
Hart’s rule of internal recognition constitutes a secondary rule
of law that governs what a legal system recognizes as its law,27
the rules of external recognition that this Article examines
might be tertiary rules of law (or constitute a subdivision of the
secondary rule).28  These tertiary rules treat one aspect of the
system’s external relations with other legal orders, namely, a
sovereign’s employment of another sovereign’s law.29  Such
24 See generally Paul B. Stephan, Competing Sovereignty and Laws’ Domains,
45 PEPPERDINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2017–2018) (manuscript at 3–6), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2905720 [https://perma.cc/7XZK-S6D8] (discussing the
concept of domain, and noting that “domain . . . describes both the potential reach
of a sovereign’s authority and the actual scope of the laws it adopts”).
25 See id. at 3 (proposing, across my four settings, “a rational-choice model
that can explain consistent patterns of deference . . . to the rules and policies of
other sovereigns in situations where the deferring sovereign has the capacity to
impose its own law”).
26 See id. at 28 & n.93 (treating adoption as “provisional deference”).
27 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–95, 100–10 (2d ed. 1994).
28 See Ralf Michaels, Law and Recognition—Towards a Relational Concept of
Law, in IN PURSUIT OF PLURALIST JURISPRUDENCE 90, 90 (Nicole Roughan & Andrew
Halpin eds., 2016); Stephan, supra note 24, at 4 n.11. R
29 See Michaels, supra note 28, at 108 (“[T]ertiary rules . . . establish [the] R
relation [of one legal order] with other legal orders . . . .”).
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rules will become increasingly important as we come to accept
the pluralism of law,30 and increasingly challenging if we were
to move toward rejecting “the idea that ‘law’ must ultimately
depend from a single validating source.”31  In any event, this
Article’s distinction between adopting and applying occupies
the first level of tertiary rules for the recognition of another
sovereign’s law.
If one backs up jurisprudentially, the subject appears to fit
into Joseph Raz’s wider concern with authority.32  His concern
involves when a decision maker should decide for itself and
when it should instead follow the dictates of another.  The de-
cider might prefer autonomy.  But the other source might, for
any of a number of reasons, be in a better position to decide.
This tension permeates law and indeed life.  For one of an infin-
itude of examples, a child will often, although perhaps not often
enough, abide by a parent’s view.  Or in the law of lawyering, it
is a familiar proposition that governmental tribunals exercising
their inherent authority may look to the bar’s rules of profes-
sional conduct, though they are not technically bound by
them.33  That is, tribunals dealing with legal ethics will usually
follow the profession’s view of lawyers’ obligations, suggesting
“that the bar’s understanding of law controls the court’s inter-
pretation.”34  Is this application or adoption?35
I
STATE LAW FOR FEDERAL ACTORS
In a federal system, whether to apply state or federal law is
the usual, indeed ubiquitous, question.  To adopt state law, or
to adopt federal law, is a less prominent phenomenon but still
an understood terminology.  In the conceptual framework for
30 See generally John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURAL-
ISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 2 (1986) (defining legal pluralism as “that state of affairs, for
any social field, in which behavior pursuant to more than one legal order occurs”).
31 Id. at 8.
32 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 57–62 (1988). See generally
AUTHORITY IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY: THEORISING ACROSS DISCIPLINES (Roger
Cotterrell & Maksymilian Del Mar eds., 2016) (examining how the concept of
authority is challenged in the transnational context).
33 See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 1389, 1475 n.372 (1992).
34 Id. at 1475; see id. at 1461 (“In cases involving the law governing lawyers,
the courts show a weak commitment to state law—to the maintenance of a state
nomos—in two basic ways.  First, they are reluctant to create legal meaning and
as a consequence create little.  Second, they show little inclination to back with
violence the legal meaning they do create.”).
35 See infra text accompanying note 334 (giving a tentative answer). R
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horizontal choice of law36 or international law, application or
adoption of law is not the usual way of thinking or talking.
Thus, the possibility of fruitfully considering both application
and adoption methods in connection with all situations involv-
ing another sovereign’s law is often overlooked.  Accordingly, I
shall systematically work through the two methods in all four
settings.
A. Application of State Law
For any legal actor in a federal system, every question of
law is preceded by the vertical choice-of-law question of
whether the legal question is a matter for state or federal law.37
If the Constitution, or Congress acting within constitutional
limits, expressly or impliedly made the choice of law, that
choice is binding on the federal courts.  An example is the
Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury, which directly
governs all federal-court civil cases.38  In the absence of such a
constitutional or congressional directive, the federal courts, or
any other federal actor, must decide whether state or federal
law applies, doing so by a Court-prescribed methodology.39
When acting as the default decision maker, the federal courts
are fixing the proper bound for applying state law, which often
involves going well beyond any constitutional or statutory com-
mand to apply state law.
36 See Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspec-
tive Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1236 (1999).  That article
explains that “horizontal” choice of law refers to a choice between “which state’s or
country’s law to apply to an issue, with respect to a transaction touching on two
or more jurisdictions,” while “vertical” choice of law refers to a choice between
federal and state law in the context of a federal legal system. Id.
37 See id.
38 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M.
CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 180, 1683 (12th ed.
2017) (stating the uncontroversial background that the Seventh Amendment is
not incorporated or implicit in Fourteenth Amendment due process, hence does
not apply to the states, and so does not constrain state civil trials; state jury
practice is widely similar to the federal, but it need not be; and for state-law
claims, the states, in fact, have generally not followed the Supreme Court’s mod-
ern expansion of the jury right).  For a congressional illustration, one can turn to
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which were enacted as a statute. Compare, e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 302 (legislating that state law governs some presumptions in federal
court), with, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 (legislating that federal law governs admissibil-
ity in federal court of subsequent remedial measures).
39 See Field, supra note 8, at 883 (“When an issue of law is not governed by a R
federal enactment—constitutional or statutory—there is always a potential ques-
tion whether state law will govern or whether federal common law will be devel-
oped to displace state law.”); see also infra note 76. R
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The key insight from this description is that the federal
actors are delineating the proper bound for applying state law.
What is the realm of governing state law and hence what is the
remaining realm of federal law?  When the choice goes for state
law, the federal actor is definitely not applying federal law, nor
is it ever creating state law.  The state law really applies, and it
governs as state law.40
Much difference of opinion exists on the details of how to
choose between state and federal law.41  Resolution of that de-
bate is not necessary for this study of applying versus adopting
state law.  To provide expressive illustrations, however, I shall
summarize my Erie view here.  As I see it, the predominant
methodology in the federal courts today, unless a Federal Rule
covers the matter,42 calls for evaluating (1) the interests of the
state that might provide applicable law, in light of all legitimate
purposes or policies reflected by its content, in having its legal
rule applied in federal court on this particular issue, in order to
see if they equal or outweigh the net sum of (2) the federal
interests in having federal law govern, which are called affirma-
tive countervailing considerations, and (3) the negative federal
interest in avoiding the forum-shopping and inequality effects
of any outcome-determinative difference between state and fed-
eral law.43  Remember, though, that the reader’s considering
my theme as to applying versus adopting is not at all depen-
dent on accepting my views on this subsidiary question.
One way or another, state law will often apply in federal
court.  It governs matters ranging from the substantive to the
procedural.  For example, state law governs tort liability in a
diversity action like Erie itself,44 statute of limitations in an
action for breach of trust,45 and burden of proof in a suit to
40 See, e.g., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 592–94 (1959) (holding
that the whole New Jersey Wrongful Death Act applies in federal court under
maritime law).
41 See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 36, at 1237–38 (enumerating various consider- R
ations that might come into courts’ Erie choice-of-law analysis and acknowledging
that “in the vertical [choice-of-law] setting . . . there is disagreement at the mar-
gins as to the appropriate rules”).
42 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466–74 (1965) (distinguishing so-
called unguided Erie decisions from situations involving a Federal Rule).
43 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436–39 (1996)
(using a balancing-of-interests approach for unguided Erie decisions, so that
federal interests called for applying the deferential federal standard of appellate
review in the federal court of appeals).
44 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938) (deciding plain-
tiff’s status as trespasser or licensee).
45 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1945) (applying state
statute of limitations to state-created claim).
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settle title to land.46  In fact, the persisting dispute over judicial
methodology does not leave the question of governing law terri-
bly unclear.  In the mentioned situations, the federal court to-
day will treat the choice of state law as routine.  And on other
issues, under any conceivable methodology, federal law very
often applies in federal question cases and often even in diver-
sity cases, as a consequence either of a constitutional or con-
gressional choice or of an already decided or relatively
predictable judicial-choice-of-law decision.47  A lack of clarity
on vertical choice of law extends only to a relatively small group
of hard cases.48  Therein lies the explanation of how our system
can live with the lack of clarity.
B. Adoption of State Law
A prime example of a hard case lay in Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States.49  There, the Court chose to apply federal law,
perhaps questionably, and then created that federal law, per-
haps even more questionably, to govern the rights and duties of
the United States on its commercial paper.50
More generally, when will the federal courts on their own
choose to apply federal law and so displace state law?  This
problem, sometimes called the Clearfield problem, is no more
than a restatement of the Erie problem.  If the judicial-choice-
of-law methodology developed under Erie ends up pointing to
federal law rather than state law, then the federal courts will
choose federal law.51
Besides Clearfield, examples range from the usual filling of
federal statutory interstices to inferring a private cause of ac-
tion.52  Another result of this judicial choice of federal law has
46 See Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939) (holding that
state law governs burden of proof on matter governed by state law); see also
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (“Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of
pleading.  The question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a
question of local law which federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases must
apply.” (internal citation omitted)).
47 See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466–74 (applicable Federal Rule).
48 See infra notes 49–55 and accompanying text. R
49 318 U.S. 363, 366–69 (1943) (treating effect of United States’ delay in
notifying check’s endorser of forgery); see also Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487
U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (holding that federal common law governs military contrac-
tors’ liability).
50 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 546–50, 656–57 (7th ed. 2015) (questioning the Clearfield
decision).
51 See supra notes 41–43, 47 and accompanying text. R
52 See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 50, at 635–777 (examining and R
analyzing post-Clearfield cases where federal law was chosen).
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been, crudely put, the formation of a series of “enclaves”53
where federal common law normally prevails, including “such
narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obliga-
tions of the United States, interstate and international disputes
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with
foreign nations, and admiralty cases”54 and also some areas of
uncodified federal procedure.55  So, there is a whole lot of room
for federal law in the federal courts.
If a judicial-choice-of-law decision points to federal law, or
if a constitutional or congressional choice points that way, the
further question of its content will arise.  Here too there is a
possible role for state law in the formulation of governing law.56
But the role would be through adoption of state law, not
application.
1. Formulation by Constitution or Congress
Just as the Constitution or the Congress could have cho-
sen for state law to apply, either could instead have gone for
application of federal law.  Oftentimes when federal law governs
by such nonjudicial choice, the Constitution or the Congress
goes on to formulate the content of the applicable federal law.57
That law is of course then binding on the federal courts.
If the choice by the Constitution or the Congress had been
for state law to apply, the federal lawmaker would have simply
delineated the realm of state-law application.58  If instead the
choice is for federal law to apply, any subsequent use of state
law in formulation of the law would be incorporation by refer-
ence.59  That is, the federal lawmaker could formulate the fed-
eral law’s content so as to include some adopted state law.
Such use of state law represents no more than a way for the
53 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
54 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (foot-
notes omitted).
55 See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537–39
(1958) (choosing federal law for nonconstitutional right to have jury decide a
certain factual issue in diversity case); Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common
Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 822–23 (2008) (examining the “overlooked body of law”
that is “procedural common law”).
56 See infra notes 57–67 and accompanying text. R
57 See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also infra note 68. R
58 See, e.g., Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“The laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or
Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of deci-
sion in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”).
59 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. R
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federal lawmaker to draft the federal law.60  A constitutional or
congressional decision to adopt state law of course binds the
federal courts to follow state law.  The court would then be
applying federal law, which includes adopted state law.  The
difference between this use of state law and Erie is very real.
The Constitution’s federal regulation of unreasonable
searches and seizures implicitly incorporates state definitions
of crime.61  Early examples of congressional adoption of state
law include the adoption in large part of state procedure for
federal courts via the static Process Act of 178962 and the dy-
namic Conformity Act of 1872.63  Today examples are rampant
in federal criminal and tax law, but they are also common in
federal law that deals with property interests or personal rela-
tionships.64  The adoption might be explicit65 or implicit.66  In-
deed, it is sometimes a difficult question whether Congress
meant to impose a uniform federal rule or to adopt state law,
although that question is clearly one to be decided by federal
law.67
2. Formulation by Federal Courts
More telling is the formulation of law by the federal courts
in cases where federal law is to apply.  If the Constitution or the
Congress has not formulated the content of the applicable fed-
eral law, the federal courts must step in to formulate the fed-
eral law.  In fact, there will be two different situations where the
federal courts must formulate this federal common law.
60 See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351–52 (1939)
(adopting state rule as federal law and noting that “the state law has been ab-
sorbed . . . as the governing federal rule not because state law was the source of
the right but because recognition of state interests was not deemed inconsistent
with federal policy”).
61 See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV; cf. United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S.
286, 287 (1969) (creating federal definition of “extortion,” while adopting state
criminal laws prohibiting such extortionate behavior to specify unlawful behavior,
in construing federal statute “prohibiting travel in interstate commerce with in-
tent to carry on ‘extortion’ in violation of the laws of the State in which
committed”).
62 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94.
63 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196.
64 See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956) (using state law
to define an author’s “children” under the Copyright Act, at least where the state’s
definition is not “entirely strange to those familiar with its ordinary usage”).
65 See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (treating FTCA).
66 See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cty., 328 U.S. 204, 209–10
(1946) (holding that a federal statute implicitly adopted the state definition of “real
property”).
67 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 50, at 677–78. R
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First, the federal courts have to formulate the law pursuant
to a constitutional or congressional declaration that chose fed-
eral law but explicitly or implicitly delegated to the courts the
formulation of that law.  For example, the federal courts might
have to formulate federal common law pursuant to a federal
statute like Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which chose federal
law to govern privilege but expressly left it to the courts to
formulate the content of that law.68
Second, when a federal court on its own chooses federal
law to govern, it also has to formulate the content.  In a situa-
tion where the lawmakers above the court in the lawmaking
hierarchy are silent and stare decisis does not control, the
court, once it chooses federal law, must create federal common
law.69  For example, in Clearfield, after choosing federal law,
the Supreme Court formulated a federal rule for treating the
effect of the United States’ delay in notifying a check’s endorser
of forgery.70  In such a situation, the federal court is not han-
dling pre-existing federal law that already covers the particular
question, because if the law did cover the point, the court
would just apply it.  Instead, the court must freshly look at
federalism policies somehow to decide if federal law should
govern.71  If so, and because that federal law does not already
exist, the court then must create the federal law.
Federal common law thereby ends up with this definition:
the body of federal rules of decision whose content did not
come directly from interpreting federal constitutional or statu-
tory provisions.72  This is occasionally termed “specialized fed-
eral common law,” to distinguish it from the general common
law that the federal courts created before Erie.73
68 FED. R. EVID. 501 (treating privilege other than for “a claim or defense for
which state law supplies the rule of decision”).  Where state law supplies the rule
of decision, Rule 501 provides that “state law governs privilege.” Id.  This provi-
sion was a congressional recognition that in those circumstances, state law has a
sufficient claim to apply in federal court. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, at 9 (1973)
(“The Committee’s proviso, on the other hand, under which the federal courts are
bound to apply the State’s privilege law in actions founded upon a State-created
right or defense, removes the incentive to ‘shop’.”); see also supra note 38. R
69 See Field, supra note 8, at 885–86; see also infra note 76. R
70 Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 366–69.
71 See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding R
when federal law might govern.
72 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common
Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 832–33 (2005).
73 See generally Mitchell A. Lowenthal et al., Special Project, Time Bars in
Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of
Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1011 n.1 (1980) (“When federal rights are at
issue . . . federal courts often engage in what, ‘for want of a better term, . . . may
[be] call[ed] specialized federal common law.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
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In performing the task of formulating federal common law’s
content, federal courts sometimes purely create common law
as in Clearfield.74  More often they simply extend some closely
related or analogous federal provision.75  But most often federal
courts opt to adopt as federal law on the point in issue the
appropriate state’s law.76
The Supreme Court has confided this healthy role for adop-
tion of state law.77  The leading case was United States v. Kim-
bell Foods, Inc.78  There the question involved priority of liens
Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964))).
74 See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. R
75 See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143,
156 (1987) (subjecting a civil RICO action to the Clayton Act’s four-year limita-
tions period).
76 As described in the text, this judicial turn to state law constitutes the last
part of a two-step process: first, some federal authority chooses federal law to
govern and, second, the court formulates the federal common law either as a new
federal formulation or by adopting a state’s law. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Various-
ness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and
State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 802–10 (1957).  If one were to take
a narrow view of when federal courts can decide that federal common law should
apply, such as only when federal interests call for a unique federal rule, then one
would predict little role for the second step of the two-step process. See Ernest A.
Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 1665
(2008) (arguing for scaling down the scope of federal common law to situations
where the state law is incompatible with pre-existing federal policy and hence
preempted).  An alternative way to minimize the two-step process is to posit such
a radically broad view of the federal common law’s scope that it virtually auto-
mates the first step. See Field, supra note 8, at 950–53 (arguing against the two- R
step process, on the view that the scope of federal common law is so very broad
that usually the only issue is whether to formulate a uniform federal rule or adopt
some state law).
77 See, e.g., Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239 (1989) (holding that in ab-
sence of federal statute of limitations for a federally created claim, federal courts
ordinarily should adopt the basic aspects of the forum state’s statute of limita-
tions for the most closely analogous state cause of action of general type). But cf.
28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2012) (providing, by a statute enacted in 1990, a default limita-
tions period for future federal enactments); Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,
541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004) (holding § 1658 to be applicable if the claim was made
possible by a post-1990 statutory amendment). See generally Lowenthal et al.,
supra note 73 (examining federal common law of limitations and its frequent R
adoption of state law).
78 440 U.S. 715 (1979); see Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U.S. 497, 508–09 (2001) (saying, while reviewing the respect a Maryland state
court owed to a statute-of-limitations dismissal by a California federal court in a
removed diversity case: “In short, federal common law governs the claim-preclu-
sive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity. . . .  This is, it seems
to us, a classic case for adopting, as the federally prescribed rule of decision, the
law that would be applied by state courts in the State in which the federal diver-
sity court sits. . . .  This federal reference to state law will not obtain, of course, in
situations in which the state law is incompatible with federal interests.”); Kamen
v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991) (adopting state’s futility-of-
demand exception for ICA derivative suit).
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on the same chattel, where one of the liens came from a federal
agency’s loan.  The Court held that in the absence of a federal
statute treating priority of liens in connection with federal
loans, federal law governed.79  “We conclude that the source of
law is federal, but that a national rule is unnecessary to protect
the federal interests underlying the loan programs.  Accord-
ingly, we adopt state law as the . . . federal rule for establishing
the relative priority of these competing federal and private
liens.”80  The federal court should adopt the priority scheme of
the appropriate state (where the liens originated) as long as that
scheme is nondiscriminatory.81  The Court thereby indicated
that the federal court can let federal interests guide which
state’s law to adopt and how much of it to adopt.
Adoption of state law is the dominant process for several
reasons.  First, it is a simple route to take.  The law is already
formulated, which could be an important consideration in a
complicated area like priority of liens.82  Second, it tends to
reduce the federal courts’ involvement in lawmaking.  This ap-
pearance is comforting from a separation-of-powers vantage.83
Third, state law probably conforms to local conditions and par-
ties’ expectations.84  Fourth, it serves to accommodate any
state interests that may be at risk, even if they are of insuffi-
cient weight to require application of state law under Erie.85
Fifth, adopting state law helps to avoid any outcome-determi-
native effect.86
79 Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 726, 740.
80 Id. at 718; see also id. at 727 (“Federal law therefore controls the Govern-
ment’s priority rights.  The more difficult task, to which we turn, is giving content
to this federal rule.”).
81 See id. at 740; see also id. at 736 n.37 (“Adopting state law as an appropri-
ate federal rule does not preclude federal courts from excepting local laws that
prejudice federal interests.”).
82 See id. at 740 (finding no “concrete reasons for rejecting well-established
[state law] commercial rules which have proven workable over time” and noting
that “the prudent course is to adopt the readymade body of state law as the federal
rule of decision”).
83 See Field, supra note 8, at 937 (noting separation-of-powers concerns as- R
sociated with judicial lawmaking and, specifically, with federal common law).
84 See Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 739–40 (considering creditors’ expectations of the
law governing liens, in light of creditors’ reliance on state law).
85 See United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[R]ejection
of the state rule should be avoided where the adoption of a different federal rule
would unduly interfere with the state’s interests.”).
86 See VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 7, at 1055–56 (“[F]ederal law is R
ordinarily deeply concerned not to introduce a potentially disturbing element of
relativity into the legal universe of citizens who participate in both the federal and
the state communities [because otherwise] the ordinary citizen might find that a
wife for state purposes was not one for federal matters . . . .”).
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The result is that whenever a federal court decides that
unformulated federal law is to govern, there is a rebuttable
presumption in favor of adopting state law as the federal com-
mon law.87  That is, federal courts should so adopt state law,
unless there is a relatively significant federal interest in uni-
formity of the federal law throughout the nation or there are
relatively important federal interests calling for a particular
content in the federal law.88
Law students tend to view this adoption of state law as an
oddity.  True, the content of the federal law adopted from state
law on, say, priority of federal liens will vary from state to state,
or even from case to case depending on the particular facts
involved.  Also, it may change over time as any adopted state
law changes, this being a dynamic adoption.89  Nonetheless,
there is nothing inherently weird about this adoption of state
law.  It captures the role of local law in any nonfederal system,
be it France or a U.S. state.  The unitary sovereign can always
choose to incorporate a subdivision’s law as the sovereign’s
law.  Its incorporation of, say, local parking rules into some
provision of the sovereign’s law will likewise vary with place and
with time.
C. Practical Implications
The Supreme Court has said that the difference between
applying and adopting state law in federal court “is of only
theoretical interest.”90  This is quite spectacularly wrong.  Ap-
plying versus adopting “makes a very substantial difference,
functionally.”91  Indeed, the point of this Article is to refute the
Court’s observation by showing the practical effects of the dif-
ference—and then by extending that important lesson from
Erie to the other settings where a sovereign employs another
sovereign’s law.92
Applying another sovereign’s law, rather than applying do-
mestic law that has a few imported elements, should have nu-
87 See Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 727–29.
88 See, e.g., id. at 740 (“[F]ormulating special rules to govern the priority of the
federal consensual liens . . . would be justified if necessary to vindicate important
national interests.”).
89 See Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881, 892–93 (5th Cir.
2001) (saying that new state statute changed the federal common law).
90 O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994) (saying that if state law
is employed, “it is of only theoretical interest whether the basis for that application
is [the state’s] own sovereign power or federal adoption of [the state’s]
disposition”).
91 Mishkin, supra note 76, at 810. R
92 See infra Parts III–IV.
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merous effects.93  True, many of these will be relatively
unimportant or be a matter of degree.  For one example, ab-
stention and certification of unsettled questions are apt to be
more common for applied foreign law than adopted foreign
law.94  For another example, after decision on foreign law and
back in the foreign sovereign’s court operating under its own
law, issue preclusion by decision of applied law is apt to be
more routine than by decision of adopted law, simply because
the party can more easily establish the required identity of
issue.95
More significantly, I have intimated that the optional adop-
tion of state law as the federal common law under Kimbell is
distinguishable as a practical matter from the binding applica-
tion of state law in federal court under Erie in two big ways: the
federal court can let federal interests guide which state’s law to
adopt and how much of it to adopt.96  The adoption/application
difference has other practical consequences of similar signifi-
cance.  I shall now run through the major, binary effects if the
federal actor adopts rather than applies state law.
1. Effect on Choice of Law in Federal Court
Application of state law under Erie calls for pretty blind
adherence by the federal actor to the state’s view of the content
of that law.  Moreover, this duty demands considerable effort to
determine correctly the state law.
A neat way to show these facts is to consider how the
federal courts act when the content of state law is unclear on a
particular matter to be governed under Erie by state law.  The
federal court must predict what the state law is.97  The federal
trial or appellate court would clarify state law by acting as if the
federal court were then sitting as the forum state’s highest
court, taking into account all the latest precedent and other
data that the state court would.98
93 See infra Part III, subpart C.
94 See FIELD ET AL., supra note 38, at 407–09. R
95 See generally ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA 114–23
(2001) (detailing how courts analyze the “same issue” requirement of issue
preclusion).
96 See supra notes 59–67, 78–88 and accompanying text. R
97 See Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (noting that
federal courts must ascertain the content of the applicable state law based on the
decisions of “the highest court of the State,” although lower-court decisions can
help reveal that state law).
98 See id.; DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1272–74 (2d Cir. 1994); cf.
Webber v. Sobba, 322 F.3d 1032, 1035–38 (8th Cir. 2003) (employing an arguably
overactive interpretation of state law); Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of
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Going beyond the content of the law applicable by vertical
choice of law, blind adherence also extends to the state’s view
on horizontal choice of law.99  The so-called Klaxon rule pro-
vides, in connection with matters governed by state law under
Erie, that the forum state’s law governs conflict of laws.100  So,
to find the potentially applicable nonfederal law for any issue in
a case, federal law tells the federal court to look to the forum
state’s choice-of-law doctrine.  That state doctrine will tell
which state’s or country’s law would govern that matter if
nonfederal law were to be applied. Klaxon is a definitive rule
without exception.101  Indeed, if the chosen foreign law is un-
clear in content, the federal court should determine the content
as if it were sitting as the forum state’s highest court.102
For adoption of state law, however, Erie does not unalter-
ably bring into federal law how the state would decide.103  The
federal lawmaker has a much greater freedom of movement.
The federal lawmaker can pick and choose among the state’s
provisions.104  And the federal court could make its own deter-
mination of unclear content of the adopted state’s law.105
Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 654–55 (1995) (arguing that a federal court should
ignore individual state judges’ personal predilections). Compare Abbe R. Gluck,
Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doc-
trine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1905–07 (2011) (arguing that a federal court should
apply state rules for statutory construction), with J. Stephen Tagert, Note, To Erie
or Not To Erie: Do Federal Courts Follow State Statutory Interpretation Methodolo-
gies?, 66 DUKE L.J. 211, 216–17 (2016) (arguing that in practice federal courts do
not apply state rules for statutory construction).
99 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
100 See id.
101 See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per
curiam) (holding that Klaxon applies without exceptions, no matter how appealing
the facts—even when U.S. servicemen, maimed and killed in an unpopular war far
from home, are left without recovery by Texas’s seemingly purposeless application
of a very foreign and rather regressive Cambodian law); Griffin v. McCoach, 313
U.S. 498, 503 (1941) (holding that Klaxon applies even when the forum state court
could not have entertained the action, such as a statutory interpleader case). But
cf. 17A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 124.30 (3d ed. 2016)
(treating the special situations of transferred and consolidated cases).
102 See Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960)
(Friendly, J.) (“Our principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to deter-
mine what the New York courts would think the California courts would think on
an issue about which neither has thought.”); AIU Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. Co., 934 F.
Supp. 2d 594, 605–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 577 F. App’x 24 (2d Cir. 2014); 19
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4507, at 209 (3d ed. 2016).
103 See Mishkin, supra note 76, at 804–05. R
104 See id.
105 See 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, § 4518, at 813–16. R
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Likewise, Klaxon has no effect on adoption of state law.106
Federal law governs.107  When adopting a state’s law, the fed-
eral lawmaker can choose which state’s law to adopt, rather
than the law that the forum state would apply.108
2. Effect on Choice of Law in State Court
The decision by a federal court to apply state law will have
no real effect on the state courts’ future behavior.109  If the
federal court has to make an Erie-guess as to the content of
state law, its decision might have persuasive effect but has no
precedential effect at all in state court.110
By contrast, the decision by a federal court to adopt state
law, as it views it, creates federal law.111  Potentially, this fed-
eral law would override state law if the federal law later came to
apply in state court under the reverse-Erie doctrine.112
3. Modifiability of Other Sovereign’s Law
As already said, application of state law under Erie means
pretty blind adherence to the state’s view, requiring considera-
ble effort to determine correctly the state law.113  Pretty blind
adherence further counsels against modifying the state law.  A
federal court must apply it as is, unless the Constitution or a
congressional statute made within constitutional limits says
otherwise.
By contrast, federal interests can override a presumptive
adoption of state law.114  Federal courts can reject state law if
any federal interests call for a certain content in or a particular
limit on the federal common law.  Thus, a federal court may
106 See Mishkin, supra note 76, at 807–08. R
107 See id.
108 See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739 (1979)
(applying the law of the state where the collateral was located); De Sylva v. Ballen-
tine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956) (indicating that the definition of “children” in the
Copyright Act adopts law of the state that created the legal relationship); Vanston
Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161–63 (1946) (authoriz-
ing an independent choice of law for adopted state law under the Bankruptcy Act);
Young, supra note 76, at 1651. R
109 Cf. Colin E. Wrabley, Applying Federal Court of Appeals’ Precedent: Con-
trasting Approaches to Applying Court of Appeals’ Federal Law Holdings and Erie
State Law Predictions, 3 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 4–16 (2006) (discussing the
precedential effect in federal court of federal decisions as to state law).
110 See id.
111 See supra notes 59–67 and accompanying text. R
112 See 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, § 4518, at 813. R
113 See supra notes 97–108 and accompanying text. R
114 See supra notes 78, 81, 88. R
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alter or ignore part or all of the relevant state law in the case at
bar.115
A nice illustration of the applied/adopted difference in
bindingness of state law comes in connection with how to han-
dle a state-generated correction, clarification, constriction, or
change of state law while the federal action or appeal is still
pending.  Originally, as in Burgess v. Seligman,116 the federal
courts just disregarded any new development of state law after
the lower federal court’s decision.  Accordingly, even if a state
statute applied in federal court under the Rules of Decision Act
of 1789,117 and the statute or its construction changed while
the federal case was on appeal, the federal appellate court ig-
nored the alteration.  But as time went on, the federal courts
began to look at recent state developments.118  The federal
courts had come to realize that if they were actually applying
state law, the law to be applied by any federal court should
normally be the actual state law then prevailing—unless the
state alteration was avowedly prospective in effect.119  Once the
Court decided Erie, it became even clearer that a state-gener-
ated correction, clarification, constriction, or change of applied
state law should affect the appeal.120  Today the general rule is
that any federal court should use the latest available data in
deciding what the applied state law is, to the extent a forum
state court would.121  Thus, a federal court of appeals could
115 See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cty., 328 U.S. 204, 210
(1946) (holding that a federal statute adopted state definition of “ ‘real property,’ so
long as it is plain, as it is here, that the state rules do not effect a discrimination
against the Government, or patently run counter to the terms of the Act”); Holm-
berg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396–97 (1946) (reading a federal tolling notion
into an adopted state statute of limitations for a particular federal action on a
federally created claim).
116 See Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33 (1883) (disregarding state deci-
sions construing the state statute that came down after the lower federal court’s
decision, and saying: “The Federal courts have an independent jurisdiction in the
administration of State laws, co-ordinate with, and not subordinate to, that of the
State courts, and are bound to exercise their own judgment as to the meaning and
effect of those laws.”).
117 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012).
118 See Sioux Cty. v. Nat’l Sur. Co., 276 U.S. 238, 240 (1928) (“We accept this
construction of the statute and accordingly set aside the conflicting interpretation
of the court below, even though it antedated the determination by the state
court.”).
119 See 17A MOORE ET AL., supra note 101, § 124.21; 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra R
note 102, § 4507, at 119, 200–02. R
120 See Note, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and Supervening Changes in State Law, 50
YALE L.J. 315, 318–21 (1940).
121 See Vandenbark v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 542–43 (1941)
(ruling that any federal court should use the latest available data in deciding what
the state law is); cf. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991)
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consider fresh state legislation or decisional law.  Indeed, the
cutoff for considering supervening state-law data has not yet
kicked in on a petition for rehearing by the appellate court or a
petition to recall its mandate.122  However, after the federal
case finally ends, the cutoff has kicked in so that any alteration
of state law, or discovered error in determining state law, is not
by itself a ground for relief from judgment under Federal Rule
60(b) or otherwise.123
By contrast, a state-generated correction, clarification,
constriction, or change of adopted state law during appeal
should not affect the federal appeal’s outcome, harkening back
to Burgess.124  Federal law might adopt state law dynami-
cally.125  But the federal actor is not necessarily trying to apply
the state’s law with perfect accuracy.  It is not even trying to
establish a federal law that would govern in other circum-
stances or at all times.  The decision on state law was proper
when adopted, even if the state law subsequently alters.  In
fact, sticking with the former state law would better conform
the federal law to then-prevailing local conditions and parties’
expectations.126  Therefore, the appellate court should not re-
verse the lower court on account of a subsequent alteration in
adopted state law.127
(ordering nondeferential review by the courts of appeals of the district court’s Erie-
guess because such review “best serves the dual goals of doctrinal coherence and
economy of judicial administration,” even in the Erie setting), criticized in
Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’
Interpretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 977 (2004) (arguing that
courts of appeal do, and should, continue to afford some deference).  More gener-
ally and consistently, the proper treatment of a supervening change of law during
appeal is to treat the change as retroactive—but the party likely forfeited the point
by not raising it in the lower court, except in the rare situations where the plain
error doctrine would relieve such forfeiture because the error seriously affected
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. See Toby J.
Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922,
925–28 (2006).
122 See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 701 F.2d 11, 11–12 (2d Cir.
1983).
123 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); see 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, § 4507, at R
201–02; Comment, Pierce v. Cook & Co.: Change in State Law as a Ground for
Relief from a Federal Judgment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 843, 848–52 (1976).
124 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. R
125 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. R
126 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. R
127 As far as I know, no case treats this effect of an alteration in adopted state
law during appeal. Cf. Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881,
891–92 (5th Cir. 2001) (saying that federal interests called for adopting the former
state law as federal common law).  The issue has most likely arisen, but the
federal courts probably followed the practice for applied state law without
thinking.
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4. Effect on Original Jurisdiction
The jurisdictional differences between application and
adoption are large and obvious.128  When state law is applied to
create a cause of action, original (or removal) federal question
jurisdiction will normally not lie.129  The courts do recognize a
rare exception for cases with an important federal element.130
In order for the exceptional state-law claim to fall within federal
question jurisdiction, the test now appears to impose three
requirements: “does a state-law claim [1] necessarily raise a
stated federal issue, [2] actually disputed and substantial,
which a federal forum may entertain [3] without disturbing any
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities”?131  But the point is that jurisdiction would
then rest on the federal element, not on the applied state law.
The situation is completely different for adopted state law
that creates a cause of action.  That adopted law is actually
federal law, after all.  So, it will support original (and removal)
federal question jurisdiction.132
5. Effect on Appellate Jurisdiction
The same pattern holds for appellate jurisdiction.  Applied
state law presents no federal question supporting the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state courts.133  However,
A rough analogy gives some support for ignoring the alteration in adopted
state law.  If on appeal from the lower court’s decision another case between the
same parties decides the same issue of law or fact in a way different from the lower
court, the appellate court does not invoke res judicata’s last-in-time rule to re-
verse, but instead ignores the later decision by treating res judicata as a forfeited
point that had to have been raised below. See Kevin M. Clermont, Limiting the
Last-in-Time Rule for Judgments, 36 REV. LITIG. 1, 7 & n.22 (2017).
128 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 50, at 663 n.4. R
129 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
130 See Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201–02 (1921)
(holding that federal question jurisdiction exists for suit by a trust company
shareholder to enjoin the trust company from investing in certain federal bonds,
when state law limited permissible investment to legal securities and the plaintiff
claimed that the federal statute authorizing the bonds’ issuance was
unconstitutional).
131 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314
(2005) (allowing removal); see Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (disal-
lowing federal question jurisdiction under Grable’s test); Empire Healthchoice
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006) (same).
132 See Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc., 547 U.S. at 713 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (“[F]or jurisdictional purposes those claims [involving adopted state law]
must still arise under federal law, for federal common law determines the rule of
decision.”); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1972) (holding that
federal common law supports federal question jurisdiction).
133 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012).
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the Supreme Court can review any questions, state or federal,
that arise in the lower federal courts.134
Contrariwise, the Supreme Court has full appellate juris-
diction on any question of adopted state law.135  Again, it really
is federal law.  The Court can thus review even a state-court
decision on a matter of state law that has been adopted into the
federal law in issue.
II
FEDERAL LAW FOR STATE ACTORS
The same pattern emerges in the converse situation, the
realm of reverse-Erie.136  Incidentally, by reverse-Erie, I refer to
the whole problem of federal law’s impact on state actors, just
as I have used Erie to refer generally to state law’s impact on
federal actors.  Thus “reverse-Erie” subsumes preemption, as I
shall explain.
Despite the similarities here to Erie and Kimbell, and de-
spite the common usage of applying and adopting terminology,
theorists are not used to thinking of states’ applying and adopt-
ing federal law as related processes.  Indeed, they seem now to
be devoting decreased attention to state adoption of federal
law.137
A. Application of Federal Law
Erie and reverse-Erie do not impose strictly the same task
on courts in applying the other sovereign’s law: Erie is telling,
say, the federal actor when to apply state law rather than cre-
ate federal law, while reverse-Erie is telling the state actor when
to apply existing federal law under the influence of the
134 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012).
135 See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cty., 328 U.S. 204, 206–07 (1946)
(holding that where federal statute adopted state definition of “real property,” the
Supreme Court could review the state court’s interpretation of the adopted state
term); PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 566–67 (3d ed.
1988); Young, supra note 76, at 1651, 1653–54. R
136 See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1
(2006) (examining the reverse-Erie doctrine).
137 The “Note on State Incorporation by Reference of Federal Law” in HENRY M.
HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
450–53 (1953), disappeared from those later editions that came after RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 518–23 (5th ed. 2003) (distinguishing
application from adoption by the terms “compelled incorporation” and “gratuitous
incorporation”).  The evolution in the casebook’s treatment is traced in David L.
Shapiro, An Incomplete Discussion of “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 91 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1931 (2016).
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Supremacy Clause.138  Nevertheless, both these situations in-
volve similar problems of determining the appropriate reach of
state and federal laws under a system of cooperative federal-
ism, and any such problem has an accommodation of interests,
against a background consciousness of federal supremacy, as
its proper answer.139
Accordingly, a great amount of federal law—be it constitu-
tional, statutory, or common law—flows down to apply in state
courts.  This application occurs by the federal government’s
command.
1. Choice by Constitution or Congress
The generalized reverse-Erie question—whether federal law
should displace state law—is a relatively simple one if the Con-
stitution or Congress, the latter acting within constitutional
limits, actually chose to displace state law in state courts, ex-
pressly or impliedly.  If so, that choice is binding on the state
courts under the Supremacy Clause.140
The Federal Constitution itself made some binding choices
of law for state actors.  For example, the Fourteenth Amend-
138 See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085,
2088–112 (2000).
139 Although reverse-Erie for state courts and Erie for federal courts are there-
fore nicely similar, the reverse-Erie scheme is not simply the mirror image of Erie.
One major difference is that reverse-Erie seems to be the slightly more intrusive
doctrine: in the procedural arena, state courts must apply federal law to federally
created claims more extensively than federal courts must apply state law to state-
created claims. See, e.g., Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 295–98 (1949).  In
that case, a plaintiff brought a Federal Employers’ Liability Act case in a Georgia
state court, and the defendant demurred; contrary to federal practice, a Georgia
rule would have construed allegations most strongly against the pleader and
resulted in dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice; but the U.S.
Supreme Court held that in the state court the Georgia pleading rule had to bow
to the more lenient federal practice.  In the Erie setting of a diversity case, a federal
court would never bow to such a state pleading practice.  The explanation for this
discrepancy between reverse-Erie and Erie is that in state court the Supremacy
Clause plays an additional role through conflict preemption, which works in favor
of federal law by rejecting any state law that imposes unnecessary burdens upon
federal rights.  In the FELA pleading example, because the state’s anti-plaintiff
pleading rule conflicted with the pro-plaintiff FELA, the state rule fell, regardless
of any state interests.  In the analogous Erie setting, where the question would be
whether a state pro-plaintiff procedural provision must apply in a diversity case,
the Supremacy Clause has no role to play, and the Erie balance manages to tilt in
favor of federal procedural interests and hence call for applying federal pleading
law.  That is, in Brown the Supremacy Clause causes federal procedure to pre-
empt state procedure, but in converse-Brown the Supremacy Clause plays no
comparable role to cause the state sovereign’s law to trump any conflicting proce-
dural rules of the home court.  Thus, reverse-Erie for state courts and Erie for
federal courts are not and should not be perfect mirror images.
140 See infra notes 145–49 and accompanying text. R
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ment chose federal due process and equal protection for the
states.141
Also, Congress can expressly or impliedly make the choice
between state and federal law, within the constitutional limits
on the powers of Congress to choose the applicable law for the
states.142  Congress frequently makes an express choice for
federal law to apply in state courts.  For example, in some
areas, such as patents, Congress can decide to regulate and
then specify substantive laws that will apply in federal and
state courts henceforth.143  Or Congress could provide proce-
dural regulations for state courts when they handle certain
types of federal-law cases.144
In discussing situations when Congress does so act, ana-
lysts frequently draw on the terminology of the preemption doc-
trine.145  They look to preemption because it is a Supremacy
Clause doctrine related to the task of determining the reach of
federal law.  Preemption, in brief, is an ill-bounded constitu-
tional doctrine that invalidates state law if it interferes with
federal law.146  Although preemption tends to focus on dis-
placement of state substantive law by congressional statute, it
can occur by federal constitutional command or federal admin-
istrative activity or even by the effect of federal common law,147
and it can extend its effect beyond substantive law to state
procedural law.148  Moreover, preemption can not only be ex-
press but also be implied; and implied preemption can trump a
state provision that conflicts by discrimination against or con-
tradiction to federal law or stands as an obstacle to federal law,
141 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
142 See Clermont, supra note 136, at 21–22; see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr., R
Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949, 950 (2006)
(focusing on the “constitutional relationship between congressional power and
state court jurisdiction”).
143 See Donald Shelby Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State
and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 657–64 (1971).
144 As to the limit on congressional authority to legislate on the operation of
state courts in state-law cases, compare Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation
of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947, 950–51 (2001) (arguing that Con-
gress cannot regulate “state court procedures” for enforcing “state law cases”),
with Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 461–63 (2003) (upholding a federal
tolling statute for state-law claims). See also Bellia, supra note 142, at 950, R
954–55 (extending the focus to congressional control of state jurisdiction in state-
law cases).
145 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 5.2,
at 412 (5th ed. 2015); CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE 84–86,
89–125 (2004); Clermont, supra note 136, at 5–8, 40–41, 45. R
146 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 145, § 5.2, at 412. R
147 See Clermont, supra note 136, at 5–6; Field, supra note 8, at 897. R
148 See Bellia, supra note 144, at 959–62. R
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or it can authorize federal law to occupy exclusively a whole
field—although of course all these categories of preemption are
blurry.149
Even if not mentioned until this point, preemption obvi-
ously constitutes an important part of Erie in federal court,
calling for the application of much federal law in federal court
without any resort to judicial balancing.150  Even more obvi-
ously, it is at work in state court.  It rejects any state law that
impermissibly collides with federal law, and does so regardless
of the outcome of any independent judicial-choice-of-law bal-
ancing methodology.151
2. Choice by State Courts
In the absence of such a constitutional or congressional
directive, the state courts and ultimately the U.S. Supreme
Court must decide whether the existing federal law applies in
state court.152  On the one hand, they may choose federal law.
Thus, in an interstate water case from the Colorado Supreme
Court and through an opinion by Justice Brandeis issued on
the same day as the Erie case, Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co.153 held that the substantive federal
common law of water, which would govern in the federal
courts,154 also binds the state courts under the Supremacy
Clause.  On the other hand, if they choose in favor of state law,
the state is left free to create and apply it.  Thus, Oregon ex rel.
State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,155 on review of
the Oregon Supreme Court, held that state law solely governed
the disputed ownership of lands along a navigable river inside
the state, after the lands had become riverbed as a result of
avulsive changes in the river’s course.
The courts must use some technique for choosing between
state and federal law for application in state court, whenever
they may, under the Constitution and federal statutes, go ei-
ther way.  The courts must do so by employing the choice-of-
law technique mandated by the Supreme Court.156  Just as the
149 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 145, § 5.2, at 413–14, 422, 429, 435. R
150 See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Erie and Preemption: Killing One Bird with Two
Stones, 90 IND. L.J. 1591, 1596–97, 1609 (2015).
151 See id.
152 See Bellia, supra note 72, at 840–45; Clermont supra note 136, at 20. R
153 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
154 See id. at 110; see also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103
(1972) (finding that federal common law applied).
155 429 U.S. 363, 381–82 (1977).
156 See Clermont, supra note 136, at 28–33. R
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Erie methodology itself is specialized federal common law, the
reverse-Erie judicial-choice-of-law methodology is a federal-
common-law creation of the U.S. Supreme Court that the state
courts must follow.
The Court, unfortunately, has not been clear in developing
the choice-of-law technique here.157  However, the develop-
ments on the Erie front shed some light.  The courts generally
appear to balance state interests in having the state law ap-
plied in state court against federal interests in having federal
law displace the state rule on this particular issue, while trying
to avoid difference in outcome.158
Under such a methodology, state courts will often have to
apply federal law.159  It governs matters ranging from the sub-
stantive to the procedural.  For example, federal law might ap-
ply in state courts not only on matters like patents and the
FELA but also on matters such as burden of proof, joinder, and
venue for federal claims160 and likewise attorney’s fees161 and
jury practice.162
In practice, judicial choice of law works together with pre-
emption.  If the state and federal laws directly collide, then the
state court must recognize that federal law preempts;163 if
there is no collision, then the state court must perform the
federally mandated accommodation of interests to choose the
applicable law.164  This judicial-choice-of-law methodology
157 See id.
158 See id. at 22–35.  Note, however, that here the outcome-determinative
effect adds to the other federal interests in having federal law applied in state
court because applying federal law would avoid any outcome-determinative differ-
ence between federal and state courts. See id. at 35–37.
159 See generally id. at 28–33 (analyzing case law).
160 See Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation,
22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 736–37, 767 n.173 (1981).
161 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1980) (applying federal attor-
ney’s fee law in a state case for violation of federal civil rights).
162 See St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 411–12 (1985) (holding
that in state-court FELA case, federal law governs on measure-of-damages jury
instructions); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 496–98 (1980) (hold-
ing that in such a case, federal law governs jury instructions as to taxability of
award); see also Monessen Sw. Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 339–42 (1988)
(holding that in such a case, federal law makes present-value calculation the
jury’s task); Neuborne, supra note 160, at 772–74. R
163 See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363–64
(1952) (holding that in state-court FELA case, federal law governs jury right);
Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1949) (holding that in such a case,
federal law governs the pleading test).
164 Compare Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 152–53 (1988) (refusing to apply
state’s notice-of-claim statute, which was preempted for federal civil rights case in
state court), with Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 913 (1997) (refusing, in such
a case, to apply federal appealability doctrine).
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complementarily explains, while it smooths, the outer reaches
of preemption.  On the one hand, in the setting that involves a
matter more of inference by judge than of implication by stat-
ute, when state law would merely frustrate federal law, those
Erie-like ideas provide refinement of how obstacle and field
preemption should work: whenever federal interests outweigh
state interests in a reverse-Erie sense, there should be preemp-
tion.165  On the other hand, as one gets into more truly inde-
pendent judicial choice of law, Erie-like ideas make the precise
location of the outer boundary of preemption unimportant, as
that boundary becomes merely a transitional zone between im-
plied preemption and judicial choice of law, somewhere in the
middle of the broad subject of reverse-Erie.
To sum up, the reverse-Erie doctrine, comprising both pre-
emption and judicial choice of law, tells the state court when to
apply existing federal law to displace state law.  Subject to the
Constitution or Congress having already chosen the applicable
law, federal law—be it constitutional, statutory, or common
law—will apply pursuant to the Supremacy Clause in state
court whenever it preempts state law or whenever it prevails by
an Erie-like judicial choice of law.
B. Adoption of Federal Law
When not compelled to apply federal law, states might
adopt federal law as state substantive or procedural law.  That
is, they can gratuitously incorporate it by reference, either stat-
ically or dynamically.166  They are more likely to do so legisla-
tively than judicially.  State tax statutes often incorporate
federal definitions and other provisions from the Internal Reve-
nue Code.167  State tort law may incorporate federal duties, as
when a state authorizes a negligence action for violation of
federal regulatory standards for drugs, doing so where federal
law does not authorize a federal cause of action for damages.168
A state may even copy in large part a federal law.  For
example, many states track the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.169  The result is state law.  This example works nicely to
show why a state sometimes adopts federal law, so acting for
165 See Clermont, supra note 136, at 35–36. R
166 However, some dozen states prohibit dynamic incorporation of federal law.
See Dorf, supra note 16, at 108. R
167 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 137, at 521–23. R
168 See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986)
(blocking removal of a state negligence suit that was based on violation of FDCA).
169 See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1425
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the same five reasons given above in regard to federal adoption
of state law.170
A state could instead abdicate its role in lawmaking, and
just defer dynamically to an already applicable federal provi-
sion.  For example, a state might say that its personal jurisdic-
tion extends to the current limits of federal due process.171  In
such event of fairly express abdication under state law, the
federal law would apply of its own force.  Therefore, such cases
would fall under the heading of application of federal law, not
adoption.
Still other state uses of federal law might look like adoption
but, for my purposes, are not adoption.  Most significantly, a
state might look to federal law as an input to decision under
state law.  For example, a state might give a deduction or credit
for a federal tax paid.172  This is not an adoptive use of federal
law in building state law.  Such a reference to federal law “as a
datum”173 is neither adoption nor application of federal law as
state law.  It is merely the recognition of a legal fact, one that
turns on federal law, as being relevant to the result under state
law.
Among the reasons for a court to refer to another sover-
eign’s law, Brainerd Currie drew a broad distinction between
“(1) the purpose of finding a rule of decision and (2) all other
purposes, including that of finding some datum made relevant
by a rule of decision supplied by the law of the forum.”174  That
is the line I am drawing here to delimit my focus.175  Restricting
(1986); see also John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts,
3 NEV. L.J. 354, 354–55 (2003) (updating the prior article).
170 See supra text accompanying notes 82–86. R
171 E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2017); see Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (giving review of a state decision where the state consti-
tution’s prohibition on searches was read to be the same as the Fourth
Amendment).
172 See Hans W. Baade, The Operation of Foreign Public Law, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J.
429, 451–52 (1995).
173 Id. at 448–49.
174 Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
754, 756 (1963); see infra notes 209 (expanding this point in connection with R
horizontal choice of law) & 294 (expanding this point in connection with interna- R
tional law).
175 Other lines are conceivable.  The realm of adoption and application would
expand under a view that distinguishes between la prise en conside´ration (looking
to foreign law for facts, say, to see what the foreign system might do in the future)
and l’application (giving the foreign law all the public and private effects it would
have at its home). See Marc Ekelmans, L’ordre public et les lois prohibitives
e´trange`res, in 3 LES CONFE´RENCES DU CENTRE DE DROIT PRIVE´ ET DE DROIT E´CONOMIQUE,
L’ORDRE PUBLIC: CONCEPT ET APPLICATIONS 257, 270 (1995); cf. id. at 271 (contrasting
the more classic distinction of “l’application, qui consiste a` donner un effet
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my discussion, and my definitions of application and adoption,
to Currie’s first category makes sense.176  My pluralism-driven
interest is the realm where application and adoption are possi-
ble alternatives.  Application is possible only where the other
sovereign’s law has a defensible claim to governing, a realm
limited to rules of decision.  “One of the major differences be-
tween cases involving a reference to foreign law for the purpose
of establishing a datum point and for the purpose of finding a
rule of decision is that in the datum point cases, typically, there
is no potential conflict of policy and interest with another
state.”177  Thus, my focus falls on rules of decision, and on
whether they are formed by application or adoption of another
sovereign’s law.
C. Practical Implications
Again there are many practical consequences of the differ-
ence between application and adoption.  I shall now run
through the consequences if federal law is adopted rather than
applied by the state actor.
1. Effect on Choice of Law in Federal Court
On any issue as to which the state actor applies federal
law, a federal actor would have applied federal law too.178  The
juridique a` une re`gle [giving a juridical effect to a rule], de la prise en conside´ration,
qui permet de tenir compte de la loi e´trange`re dans la mesure ou` elle fait partie de
l’hypothe`se de la re`gle [allowing to take into account the foreign law to the extent
it is a predicate of the rule]” (footnote omitted)).
176 Admittedly, drawing the line between adoption and datum can be difficult
for choice-of-law purposes. See Herma Hill Kay, Conflict of Laws: Foreign Law as
Datum, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 59–62 (1965).  A difficult example might be a borrow-
ing statute for the statute of limitations. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 202 (MCKINNEY
2017) (“An action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state cannot
be commenced after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of either the
state or the place without the state where the cause of action accrued, except that
where the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of the state the time
limited by the laws of the state shall apply.”).  But for my purposes, not much
turns on the precise location of the line where my brand of “adoption” fades into
datum.
177 Kay, supra note 176, at 63. R
178 See Clermont, supra note 136, at 37 n.161 (recognizing the theoretical R
possibility of “a circularity in application of procedural law, with the federal court
applying state law in pursuit of conformity and the state court ironically applying
federal law on the same issue in the same pursuit of conformity,” but concluding:
“Reassuringly, this highly unrealistic result could never occur in actuality, be-
cause the Erie balance always must precede the reverse-Erie balance and so the
state court will know if the federal court would apply state law.  That is, even in
state court, the first question is what law the federal court would apply; and if the
answer is state law, then under reverse-Erie the state court will likewise apply
state law, because only state interests persist.”).
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decision by a state court to apply federal law will have no effect
on the federal courts’ future behavior.  A state court’s decision
as to the content of federal law might have persuasive effect but
has no precedential effect at all in federal court.179
By contrast, the decision by a state actor to adopt federal
law creates state law. Erie and Klaxon have full application in
bringing that state law into federal court.  Indeed, the federal
court would have to apply what it thinks the state’s highest
court would say is the content of adopted federal law.180  This
must be so because an adopting state could pick and choose
among the federal provisions, or take a static approach or even
adopt federal law as it existed before the Civil War.  Moreover, a
state court could make its own determination of the content of
adopted but unclear federal law, perhaps developing idiosyn-
cratic rules about what sources to consult.  The issue is not
what is the federal law, but rather how does the state choose to
view adopted federal law.
To get a sense of the glory of this subject, imagine that a
federal court decides a question of applied state law containing
adopted but unclear federal law, that the state’s practice is to
conform any such adoptee to current federal law, and that the
federal case comes up to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Su-
preme Court then needs to ask what the state’s highest court
would predict the Supreme Court would do.  (Indeed, the lower
federal courts could not look to what the Supreme Court would
rule on the legal question, but rather to what the Supreme
Court would think the state court would predict the Supreme
Court would do.)  In the real world, a federal court would prob-
ably just make a de novo determination of the federal law,181
but in principle the mental process should be more gymnastic.
There is a difference between what X thinks the law is and what
X thinks Y thinks X thinks the law is.
Interestingly, this conundrum would not appear if a state
were applying federal law and predicting what the Supreme
Court would do.182  When the state case applying unclear fed-
179 See id. at 31–32 (“[A state court] will decide in accordance with existing
federal law, but never create federal law.”).
180 See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. R
181 Cf. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 (1986) (dic-
tum) (treating the analogous situation of Supreme Court review of a state-court
decision on adopted federal law and assuming a de novo determination of federal
law by the Court: “Petitioner’s concern about the uniformity of interpretation,
moreover, is considerably mitigated by the fact that, even if there is no original
district court jurisdiction for these kinds of action, this Court retains power to
review the decision of a federal issue in a state cause of action.”).
182 See infra text accompanying note 187. R
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eral law reaches the Supreme Court, the Court will ask what
the law is, not what the state would predict the law is.  So that
is another difference between adoption and application.
2. Effect on Choice of Law in State Court
If the state court determines that federal law governs, then
the state court applies it as is.  Here, it becomes ever clearer
that applying another sovereign’s law is a task different from a
court’s deciding under its own sovereign’s law.  Application of
federal law under reverse-Erie calls for pretty blind adherence
by the state actor to the federal government’s view of that law’s
content.183
The federal law might be constitutional, statutory, or com-
mon law; it might be purely federal, or it might involve state law
adopted as federal law.  In the reverse-Erie setting, the state
court is merely an applier of federal law and can never act as a
creator of federal law.  Although the state court is competent to
decide questions of federal law, it must act as if it were a federal
court and try to decide the federal questions in accordance with
the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of federal law.184
At the time of the state court’s decision, the federal law
might already be fully formulated or might still be simply incip-
ient.  The state court may have to envisage the federal courts’
Erie analysis to determine the reach of federal law and its con-
tent.185  Indeed, sometimes the state court has to be the very
first to enunciate the federal law.  It has this authority to enun-
ciate federal law, as long as it decides in accordance with the
federal law: it must act by trying to discern what the U.S.
Supreme Court would decide is the federal law, and not by
undertaking to formulate federal law as an independent fed-
eral-law giver acting in pursuit of the policies and principles
that might guide it as a state-law creator.  That is, the state
court should act in the same manner as federal courts do when
applying state law under Erie.  In both the reverse-Erie setting
and the Erie setting, the court’s job is to apply the other sover-
eign’s “existing” law, not to “make” law for the other.186
More precisely, if the content of the governing federal law is
really unclear, how should the state court determine what the
federal law says?  Are state courts bound by lower federal
courts on the federal law’s content?  The better view—mainly
183 See Clermont, supra note 136, at 30–32. R
184 See id.
185 Bellia, supra note 72, at 839 & n.65. R
186 See id. at 839 n.64, 889, 908 n.369.
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trying to effectuate the constitutional status of state courts,
while accepting some local disuniformity in the short term—is
that the state courts should try to determine de novo what the
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled or would rule.187  On the one
hand, the state court should not consider itself actually bound,
rather than merely informed, by the local federal courts’ rul-
ings.188  On the other hand, the state court would tend to be
bound under stare decisis by decisions within that state’s hier-
archy of courts as to the federal law’s content.  Note the
profound implication of this view: it makes the state courts into
judicial hierarchies that can independently enunciate federal
law, parallel to the lower federal courts and the other states’
courts, and subject only to rare U.S. Supreme Court review.189
For state adoption of federal law, by contrast, reverse-Erie
does not unalterably bring into state law how the federal courts
would decide.  The state lawmaker has complete freedom of
movement.  The state lawmaker can pick and choose among
the federal provisions.  And the state court could make its own
determination of the content of federal law.
3. Modifiability of Other Sovereign’s Law
As just said, application of federal law under reverse-Erie
means pretty blind adherence to the federal government’s view.
A state court must apply it as is.  By contrast, state interests
control any adoption of federal law.  State courts can refuse to
adopt any part of federal law that impinges on state interests.
Again, a nice illustration of the difference in bindingness of
federal law comes in connection with how to handle a federally
generated correction, clarification, constriction, or change of
federal law while the state action or appeal is still pending.190
If the state courts are applying federal law, the law to be applied
by any state court is the actual federal law then prevailing,
unless the federal change was avowedly prospective in effect.
187 See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1075–76 (7th Cir.
1970); Hall v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 865 (Pa. 2004). But see
Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 735–37 (9th Cir. 1991); State v. Dukes, 745
S.E.2d 137, 141 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013). See generally Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into
the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascer-
tain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1145 (1999) (arguing that state
courts should decide questions of federal law the way they think the U.S. Su-
preme Court would decide them).
188 See Bellia, supra note 72, at 839. R
189 See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457,
1473–78 (2005).
190 Cf. supra notes 116–23 and accompanying text. R
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The general rule is that any state court must use the latest
available data in deciding what the federal law is, to the extent
a federal court would.
By contrast, a federally generated correction, clarification,
constriction, or change of adopted federal law during appeal
should not necessarily affect the state appeal’s outcome.191
State law might adopt federal law dynamically.  But the state
actor might not be devoted to applying the federal law with
complete accuracy.  It is probably not trying to establish a state
law that would govern in all circumstances and times.  The
decision on federal law was proper when adopted.  Indeed,
sticking with the former federal law would better conform the
state law to then-prevailing local conditions and parties’ expec-
tations.  Therefore, the appellate court should not reverse the
lower court on account of a subsequent alteration in adopted
federal law.
4. Effect on Original Jurisdiction
When federal law is applied to create a cause of action,
original (or removal) federal question jurisdiction will normally
lie.192  The courts also recognize federal question jurisdiction
for cases with an important element of applied federal law.193
The situation is completely different for adopted federal
law.  That adopted law is actually state law, and so it will not
support original (or removal) federal question jurisdiction.194
5. Effect on Appellate Jurisdiction
Yet another pattern holds as to appellate jurisdiction.  Of
course, applied federal law presents a federal question sup-
porting the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.195
191 Cf. supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text. R
192 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). But cf. Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177
U.S. 505, 513 (1900) (holding that federal jurisdiction does not exist for a suit to
determine the right to possession of a mining claim, when a federal statute au-
thorized this type of suit but directed that local law should govern the rights
involved); 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER &
RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3563, at 225–26 (3d ed.
2008) (discussing limits on Shoshone).
193 See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
312–14 (2005) (allowing removal); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S.
180, 201–02 (1921) (upholding original federal question jurisdiction); supra text
accompanying note 130. R
194 See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813–17 (1986)
(blocking removal); 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 192, § 3563, at 222–24; Ronald R
J. Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 HARV. L. REV. 289, 322–25
(1969).
195 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN202.txt unknown Seq: 35 19-JAN-18 13:38
2018] DEGREES OF DEFERENCE 277
Such appeal serves a vital purpose, as it allows a federal au-
thority to review any of the many applications of federal law by
the state courts.  Indeed, this is why the Supreme Court’s ap-
pellate jurisdiction is typically much wider than the district
courts’ original jurisdiction, allowing the federal authority to
get a crack at all the federal questions that end up in state
courts because of restrictive original-jurisdiction doctrines like
the well-pleaded complaint rule.196
As to questions of state law that adopts federal law, the
early, and logical, position was that the Supreme Court had no
appellate jurisdiction over any such question because it would
involve only state law.197  After all, the issue on review is not
what is the federal law, but rather how does the state choose to
view federal law.198  But over the years, the Court appears to
have come routinely, albeit of course rarely, to review state-
court decisions on a matter of federal law adopted into or other-
wise affecting state law.199
The rationale for this expansion of appellate jurisdiction is
questionable.200  If the state law copied federal law such as the
Federal Rules without expressly referring to federal law, there
would be no review by the Supreme Court.  Even if there is an
express adoption, there seems to be little federal interest in
providing review, besides the abstract interest to ensure that
even adopted federal law gets a “correct” and uniform interpre-
tation—but how strong is that interest if a state’s law has
merely adopted the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of taxa-
ble income?  The interest grows only slightly stronger if the
state has adopted federal law to impose a duty on persons not
covered by federal law.201  A better argument for Supreme
196 See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 471–73
(1911) (reviewing a federal issue in a state case, after having refused original
federal question jurisdiction in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149 (1908)).
197 See Miller v. Anderson, 150 U.S. 132, 136–37 (1893) (expressing the
Court’s former blanket view by dismissing writ of error where a railroad’s power to
convey was limited by a state statute, which incorporated a federal statute’s limits
on the railroad’s power).
198 See supra text accompanying note 181. R
199 See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 478 U.S. at 816 & n.14 (dictum); St. Louis,
Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 293 (1908) (“But it may not be
out of place to say that in no other manner can a uniform construction of the
statute laws of the United States be secured, so that they shall have the same
meaning and effect in all the States of the Union.”).
200 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 137, at 521–23 (questioning the strength of R
the arguments for federal review).
201 See Note, Supreme Court Review of State Interpretations of Federal Law
Incorporated by Reference, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1503 (1953) (focusing on Fed-
eral Safety Appliance Act cases, and saying inter alia: “If a state were to pass a
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Court review exists if the state has adopted federal law by au-
thorizing suit for violation of a person’s existing federal duty,
thus regulating the same primary conduct.202  Therefore, the
best solution might be a middle course, perhaps even a discre-
tionary course, as opposed to going either for no appellate ju-
risdiction or for full appellate jurisdiction.203
To continue this Article’s theme, I could just observe that
the very hesitancy shown through the years as to appellate
jurisdiction over adopted federal law204 demonstrates the sig-
nificant jurisdictional impact of adoption.  Still, the current
exercise of this strange appellate jurisdiction stands out as the
one real perturbance in my scheme.  Thus, I need to go further.
I maintain that it is the previous misunderstanding of this
appellate jurisdiction that creates an illusion of perturbance.
The Court here is not reviewing the state decision on adopted
federal law, as others have viewed it doing, but rather the Court
is resolving the federal question in order that the state court on
remand can act without any misconceptions.  In other words,
the Court is using its jurisdiction, in its discretion, to create a
rough analog to federal-court certification of unsettled state-
law questions, which go to the state’s highest court if the state
is willing.205  Once the Supreme Court clarifies the federal
statute making the safety requirements of the FSAA applicable to intrastate trolley
cars, the Supreme Court would not be justified in reviewing state interpretations
of the incorporated federal law.”).
202 See Greene, supra note 194, at 325–26 (suggesting as the test for appellate R
jurisdiction “if federal law of its own force is either actually or potentially regula-
tive of the conduct which gave rise to the suit”); Note, supra note 201, at 1502 R
(“Through Supreme Court review that uniformity of state and federal law which
was sought by the state in incorporating the federal duty is achieved; it must be
clear that ultimate uniformity can only be achieved by having one final arbiter
define the statute for both state and federal purposes.”); cf. Greene, supra note
194, at 295, 308–09 (including, as satisfying his test, the situation where private R
parties by contract assume duties under federal law).
203 See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
565 (1985) (arguing broadly that the Court has an “implicit power to choose”
whether to review issues of adopted federal law in light of “the strength of the
federal interest”); cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1893–97 (2004) (agreeing as to discretionary appellate
jurisdiction, but disagreeing as to Shapiro’s willingness to embrace discretionary
original jurisdiction too).
204 See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. R
205 See FIELD ET AL., supra note 38, at 408–09.  The Court’s exercise of this R
jurisdiction should not be seen as involving an advisory opinion because its
decision relates to a genuine dispute actually pending in the state court and
because any such decision is binding as far as it goes. Cf. Wendy L. Watson,
McKinzie Craig & Daniel Orion Davis, Federal Court Certification of State-Law
Questions: Active Judicial Federalism, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 98, 99–101 (2007) (discuss-
ing the federal-to-state procedure).  Moreover, the Court advises in other, more
ordinary contexts. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
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question, the state court would be free to adopt that interpreta-
tion or to take any other view of what the state law has adopted
as state law.  Some of the Court’s cases support this reading.
The leading case of Standard Oil Co. of California v. Johnson206
involved an unsettled question of adopted federal law.  After
declaring the federal law’s content, the unanimous Court en-
ded this way: “Whether the California Supreme Court would
have construed [its law in the same way if it knew our view of
federal law], we have no way of knowing. . . .  Accordingly, we
reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the court below
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”207
In sum, the Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction over
state-law questions that entail adopted federal law, but it can
and occasionally does choose to clarify federal-law questions
that arguably bear on state law in state courts.
Thus far this Article has run through the accepted applica-
tion/adoption distinction in the field of federalism.  The trip
took us through the doctrinal weeds of the subject.  It thereby
brought enhanced comprehension on some points, such as
how to determine the other sovereign’s law and how to account
for late changes in that law, but also new insights on old
problems, such as the current subsection on how to explain
the Supreme Court’s review of state law that adopts federal law.
III
FOREIGN LAW FOR U.S. ACTORS
Now this Article shifts gears, taking more of a bird’s-eye
view of horizontal choice of law and of international law.  It
innovatively applies the application/adoption distinction to
these subjects.  However, the twin aims of enhancing compre-
hension and sparking insight remain the same.
Admittedly, people do not usually think of horizontal
choice of law in terms of applying versus adopting the foreign
law.208  But what if they did?  The foregoing federal and state
448–49 (1952) (deciding that personal jurisdiction was constitutionally permissi-
ble because of a concern that the Ohio court’s dismissal might have been influ-
enced by that consideration); FALLON ET AL., supra note 137, at 522 & n.3 (citing R
cases where the Supreme Court’s clarification of possibly applicable federal law
permitted the state court on remand to act “free from any misconception”).
206 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
207 Id. at 485.
208 Recall that “foreign” in this particular context can refer to the law of a U.S.
state or another country.  For the purposes of conflict of laws, U.S. states are
treated as sovereigns, albeit ones sometimes constrained by constitutional limits.
In fact, the American law for international conflicts largely overlaps interstate
conflicts law.  Thus, what is said in the text about international choice of law
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lessons might carry over to this and all other settings where a
sovereign resorts to another sovereign’s law to govern a claim, a
defense, or any element thereof.209  In theory, the lessons
should carry over, because federalism really is a choice-of-law
problem.
True, our country’s federalism problem was partly settled
by a treaty-like but especially binding agreement, called the
Constitution.  This joint-venture contract among thirteen inde-
pendent state sovereigns created a federal government of lim-
ited and separated powers, with special prominence in the
contract given to its choice-of-forum and choice-of-law provi-
sions.  The choice-of-law portion of the constitutional contract
was in fact so prominent that it proves useful to view the Con-
stitution as centrally a conventional choice-of-law agreement,
with the states here giving such-and-such legal matters to the
federal government but retaining this-and-that for state law,
and so on through the document.210  Thus, the constitutional
flavor of federalism’s choice of law should not restrict its
lessons.
Likewise true, the federal-state relation differs from the
relation between states, between countries, or between nations
and international law.  The Supreme Court has explained that
the Supremacy Clause and the fact that we are one nation
make the federal-state relation unique for us.211  States do not
bear the same relation to the central government’s laws that
they bear to the laws of sister states, foreign countries, or the
international community.  Nonetheless, one can see methods of
both application and adoption at work in all these settings.
carries over to interstate choice of law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 10 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
209 Courts can look to foreign law for various other reasons.  The foreign law
could be a datum in the case at bar. See Zachary D. Clopton, Judging Foreign
States, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 15, 19 (2016) (saying that “U.S. courts sit in
judgment on foreign laws . . . when they serve as inputs in domestic doctrinal
analyses,” giving as an example where “defendants in breach of contract cases
may plead supervening foreign illegality”).  Or courts might look to foreign law for
help in interpreting local law. See Steven G. Calabresi & Bradley G. Silverman,
Hayek and the Citation of Foreign Law: A Response to Professor Jeremy Waldron,
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1; David J. Seipp, Our Law, Their Law, History, and the
Citation of Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1417 (2006).  But such uses are weaker
effects of foreign law, not a form of either application or adoption. See supra text
accompanying note 174. R
210 Accord Stephan, supra note 24, at 23 (calling the Constitution “an express R
domain-assignment compact”).
211 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 388 (1947) (rejecting Rhode Island’s view that
the federal government “is ‘foreign’ to the State in the ‘private international’ . . .
sense”).
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Therefore, application/adoption lessons can travel be-
tween the above-discussed federal and state categories and the
other settings.212  This new vantage, which takes into account
application versus adoption, might make our legal practices a
bit more comprehensible.  In that discussion, I shall continue
to emphasize the behavior of courts, but only because they
provide familiar examples that are readily understood.  Fur-
ther, the reconceptualization might generate some new, even if
modest, insights.  For example, the treatment of foreign law in
American courts appears to have evolved from adoption to
application.
A. Adoption of Foreign Law
The old American view, before the revolutionary changes of
the twentieth century, generally rested on territoriality in its
restrictive sense and on comity in its usual sense of nonobli-
gatory discretion.213  The origin of that view lay in the writings
of Ulrich Huber, who posited in 1689 both that “[t]he laws of
each state have force within its territory but not beyond” and
“[o]ut of comity, foreign laws may be applied so that rights
acquired under them can retain their force, provided that they
do not prejudice the state’s powers or rights.”214  Joseph Story
enshrined those ideas in American law while somewhat re-
shaping them, especially by stressing comity as the way to
justify adopting foreign law:
[T]he phrase ‘comity of nations’ . . . is the most appropriate
phrase to express the true foundation and extent of the obli-
gation of the laws of one nation within the territories of an-
other.  It is derived altogether from the voluntary consent of
the latter, and is inadmissible when it is contrary to its
known policy or prejudicial to its interests.215
212 See Bauer, supra note 36, at 1239; Clermont, supra note 136, at 3 n.7. R
213 See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 24.29, at 1485 (5th ed. 2010).
214 Id. § 2.5, at 15; see Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, in
SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 136, 136–37 (1947).
215 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 38, at 35 (Boston,
Little & Brown 8th ed. 1883) (footnote omitted); see id. § 23, at 25 (“A state may
prohibit the operation of all foreign laws, and the rights growing out of them,
within its own territories.”); SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CHOICE OF LAW 49–53 (2016)
(stressing the lack of English influence on American private international law).
Huber’s idea of comity might have been more a mandatory command. Compare S.
Nathan Park, Equity Extraterritoriality, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. (forthcoming
2017–2018) (manuscript at 69–70), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2824752 [https:/
/perma.cc/2ME7-JJ4R] (stressing the need to balance proper respect for territori-
ality with the “mandatory obligation” of comity in developing a modern “[e]quity
[e]xtraterritoriality” doctrine), with William S. Dodge, International Comity in
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In other words, foreign law had no force of its own, and so
could be overridden by local interests.  Even though no one was
expressly saying that the forum court was making the foreign
law part of its domestic law, as the federal and state courts may
do with each other’s law, I still consider this “adoption” rather
than “application,” because the forum court was consciously
applying its own law while it voluntarily looked to the foreign
rule of decision in the attempt to get to the right result in the
particular case.  The forum court was not recognizing the for-
eign law’s claim to govern of its own force, as it would do with
application.  The essential adoption/application distinction lies
in whose law effectively governs the case: forum law or foreign
law?
I do not mean to suggest that all courts and all theorists
spoke with one voice.  For one, Joseph Beale eventually reintro-
duced the quite different idea of vested rights: “A right having
been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its exis-
tence should follow everywhere.  Thus an act valid where done
cannot be called in question anywhere.”216  He thereby gave a
much more tangible sense than did comity for when the forum
court should look to foreign law.  But he still saw the judicial
function as local adoption of foreign-accrued rights that should
travel with the person or thing.  He was endorsing the enforce-
ment of foreign-created rights under the forum’s law.  He was
not calling for applying the foreign law.  Even more clearly than
his predecessors, he called for applying forum law.  One must
recall that Beale began the first Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws on this Note:
No state can make a law which by its own force is operative in
another state; the only law in force in the sovereign state is its
own law, but by the law of each state rights or other interests
in that state may, in certain cases, depend upon the law in
force in some other state or states.217
Additionally, Herbert Goodrich’s standard hornbook of the
early twentieth century railed against the use of the word “com-
ity,” but it did so in a way that reinforced the idea of
voluntariness:
American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2085–86 (2015) (discussing Huber’s
view of comity as a necessary means to solve the problems created by territorial-
ity).  But Story made it more a matter of discretion. See ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH
STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 8–9, 27–44
(1992).
216 3 JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR., A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
517 (1902) (citation omitted).
217 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1934).
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Such a conception of the matter [comity] supposes one
sovereign state stepping back, and, as a matter of courtesy,
allowing the law of another to operate within the territory of
the first.  Each recognition of the foreign law or rights ac-
quired under it would then involve a temporary abrogation of
sovereign power on the part of the state affording the
recognition.
If this were true, extension of Conflict of Laws doctrines
would be something to regard with distrust.  We should not
look with favor upon the proposition that a state should hand
over its power to declare its law to another, however
competent.218
Even as cracks started to develop in the traditional system,
theorists still adhered to the view that the local law alone con-
trolled.219  Although Walter Wheeler Cook attacked the tradi-
tionalists, he argued that, when justice required, the local law
should generate a remedy that approximated what the foreign
law would do.  As a legal realist, he saw the domestic sovereign
as the sole source of law.  So he, more clearly than his prede-
cessors, was expressly arguing for adoption of foreign law:
The view outlined may be stated as follows: the forum, when
confronted by a case involving foreign elements, always ap-
plies its own law to the case, but in doing so adopts and
enforces as its own law a rule of decision identical, or at least
highly similar though not identical, in scope with a rule of
decision found in the system of law in force in another state
or country with which some or all of the foreign elements are
connected . . . .  The rule thus ‘incorporated’ into the law of
the forum . . . thus enforces not a foreign right but a right
created by its own law.220
In short, then, the various traditional approaches to choice
of law, in the past and where they still prevail, could be seen as
variations on the common theme of adoption of foreign law.
American courts have usually so acted on a case-by-case basis.
American sovereigns could legislatively adopt foreign law (or
even nonsovereign law), but they have not normally done so.221
218 HERBERT F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 7 (1927).
219 See ROBERT L. FELIX & RALPH U. WHITTEN, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 2, 4, 15
(6th ed. 2011) (discussing local law theory); HAY ET AL., supra note 213, § 2.8 R
(discussing Cook’s contributions).
220 WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 20–21 (1942); see id. at 21 n.41a (“The use of the word ‘incorporated’ here
has led at least one critic to ascribe to the present writer the theory that the
foreign ‘law’ is in some mysterious way actually ‘incorporated’ as ‘law’ into the
legal system of the forum.  Clearly all that is meant is that the forum models its
own applicable rule of law upon the foreign rule of law.”).
221 See Dorf, supra note 16, at 108–11. R
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Indeed, they could delegate the power to adopt foreign law to
private actors.222  A useful way to look at parties’ choice-of-law
contracts is as such a delegation, with the sovereign remaining
able to override the parties’ choice of law.223
B. Application of Foreign Law
The Conflicts Revolution of the 1960s introduced a good
number of new choice-of-law methodologies.224  The most
prominent example might be interest analysis in its broad
sense.225  I elide the details of these methodologies, however,
because my concern is not with the most important practical
question: when to recognize some foreign law?226  Instead, my
concern is the jurisprudential question: how, by adoption or by
application, does the forum effect the recognition of foreign law
when recognition is appropriate?
The Conflicts Revolution is often phrased in terms of a
departure from wooden lex loci rules, based on territorial fac-
tors without consideration of the laws’ content, and a shift
toward functional analysis of competing laws.227  Of course,
the motivation of the revolutionaries was the growing despair
with the traditional approaches’ techniques and results in ac-
tual cases.  Yet in terms of doctrine, it looks like a shift from
wooden rules to functional analysis.
Nonetheless, it might be equally effective to conceive of the
Revolution in terms of a switch from adoption to application of
foreign law, from importing foreign views into domestic law as a
matter of comity to recognizing the foreign law’s claim to gov-
ern.  One could say that, spurred by the same despair, the
222 See id. at 114 n.29.
223 See MARIA HOOK, THE CHOICE OF LAW CONTRACT 16–18, 44–48, 63–73,
125–29 (2016).
224 See Linda Silberman, (American) Conflict of Laws Revolution, in ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (Ju¨rgen Basedow et al. eds., 2017).
225 See Bauer, supra note 36, at 1282 (“[M]any states now seek to identify the R
interests that the several jurisdictions would have in seeing their rule of law
applied to the dispute, and analyze and then sometimes weigh these interests in
opting for the appropriate legal standard.”); Anthony J. Colangelo, Absolute Con-
flicts of Law, 91 IND. L.J. 719, 769–70 (2016) (stressing fairness to parties); cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (selecting
the tort law of the state that “has the most significant relationship to the occur-
rence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6”).
226 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Determining the Territorial Scope of State Law in
Interstate and International Conflicts: Comments on the Draft Restatement (Third)
and on the Role of Party Autonomy, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 381 (2017)
(distinguishing the two steps of determining the scope of potentially applicable
laws and of deciding the priority of those candidates).
227 See, e.g., RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.1,
at 55 (6th ed. 2010).
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revolutionaries came to recognize that getting to the just result
sometimes called for applying foreign law.  There is at least a
correlation: in the United States a switch from adoption to
application came at the time of the Conflicts Revolution.228
After this switch to potential application, the judicial job
became choosing which law applies in a pluralist world, divin-
ing by construction and interpretation which law should be
seen in spatial terms as meant to apply.229  Rather than think-
ing that the local law would wisely adopt the law of the place of
the wrong to decide the case in the local court, the court wor-
ried about which law should regulate the behavior in issue.
Symptomatic of the change in judicial thinking was the emer-
gence of new doctrines such as “false conflicts,” which consid-
ers the absence of a state’s interest.230  Such a consideration
would be relevant only to an inquiry into which law has a claim
to apply.
Thus, the horizontal choice-of-law process now works as
Erie and reverse-Erie does, with the local legal actor deciding
when the foreign law applies.  Here the locally self-imposed,
internal directive does not in fact result in the other sovereign’s
law applying ex proprio vigore, but rather it represents a choice
by local law to treat the foreign law as if it were directly applica-
ble.  It is thus essentially a recognition of the foreign law’s
status as being almost co-equal.
The internal directive to apply foreign law could result from
a dictate by constitution231 or statute232 or treaty,233 or con-
ceivably by adoption of international law.234  Such provisions
would provide that foreign law governs; or they could, and do
sometimes, provide that foreign law does not apply.235  The
interpretation of statutes’ extraterritoriality, in particular, is
228 See HAY ET AL., supra note 213, §§ 2.2–.4, 2.6 (describing much earlier R
European roots for application of foreign law).
229 See id. § 2.12, at 52. But see Ernest A. Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorpo-
ration of International Law, 120 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 28, 35 (2007) (“[Foreign] law
does not apply ‘of its own force’ in such cases; rather, application of foreign law is
permitted to the extent that the relevant state or federal choice of law rules permit
it.”).
230 See HAY ET AL., supra note 213, § 2.9, at 30–32. R
231 See id. § 3.61.
232 See id. § 3.62.
233 See id. § 3.56.
234 See infra Part IV.
235 See Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 219,
219 (2014) (discussing the growing trend among states to “bar the use of foreign
law in American courts”).
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challenging and contested.236  This interpretation task should
fade into judicial choice of law as the statute becomes less
express.  Indeed, the choice of foreign law in most situations
follows from the operation of the prevailing choice-of-law meth-
odology, done on a case-by-case basis by a court.
Again, I do not mean to suggest that all modern courts and
theorists speak with one voice.  Some modernists abandon the
search for the spatially correct solution and look instead for the
substantively best solution.237  The most prominent example of
these value-oriented approaches is the choice-of-law methodol-
ogy that selects the “better law.”238  If the better law is a foreign
law, this methodology would seem to be a throwback to or
beyond the forum’s adopting the foreign law rather than apply-
ing it.239  That is, instead of deciding whether the foreign law in
spatial terms was meant to apply, the court is saying that local
law applies and that it chooses the better law among the pos-
sibilities and hence the better result.240
C. Practical Implications
Because I am postulating an evolution from adoption to
application, the reader may perceive the difference as more
than ever a matter of degree.  Although adoption (foreign law
being consulted to define rights under the local law) and appli-
cation (foreign law governing as if by its own force in recogni-
tion of its spatial reach) are different in theory, various
jurisdictions might in reality fall along a spectrum.
Nonetheless, most of adoption/application’s practical im-
plications work out in binary fashion, so the switch from one
side of the spectrum to the other would be consequential.  It
may be that the switch is not so significant as to encapsulate
the Conflicts Revolution, in the way that I conceive of the
Revolution’s drastic move from incorporating foreign law to ac-
tually bowing to it.  But the switch does have real conse-
236 See Carlos M. Va´zquez, Out-Beale-ing Beale, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 68 (2016)
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s presumption against extraterritoriality was a
throwback to the strict territorialist approach to choice of law of Joseph Beale, but
that lately the Court, by strengthening and expanding the presumption, has out-
Beale’d Beale).
237 See HAY ET AL., supra note 213, § 2.12. R
238 See id. § 2.13.
239 See FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 219, § 7, at 12. R
240 See HAY ET AL., supra note 213, § 2.12, at 53 (summarizing this view thus: R
“Resolving such disputes in a manner that is substantively fair and equitable to
the litigants should be an objective of conflicts law as much as it is of internal
law.”); cf. Stephan, supra note 24, at 9, 59–68 (seeing the better-law approach as R
an attack on rule formalism).
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quences.  Moreover, theorizing about the switch makes those
consequences a lot more comprehensible.  Adoption/applica-
tion is a useful lens through which to view choice of law.
As already intimated, one way to tell adoption from appli-
cation is the decreasing freedom of the local court to override
the foreign law in the name of public policy.  Another obvious
difference is that plaintiffs can sue and defendants can defend
directly on foreign law if it is applied law.  But there are other
consequences.  I shall now run through the practical differ-
ences if foreign law is applied rather than adopted.
1. Effect on Choice of Law in Federal Court
The shift from adoption to application should affect how a
federal court determines and clarifies the content of foreign
law.  In the old days of adoption, courts could employ presump-
tions and develop idiosyncratic rules about what sources to
consult.241  In the new days of application, courts should put
themselves into the shoes of the highest foreign court and de-
cide what it would say.
Adoption versus application of foreign law does not have a
direct effect on federalism.  On the one hand, under Erie and
Klaxon, state law will bring up into federal court whatever the
state would do with respect to choice of law on an issue gov-
erned by state law.242  On the other hand, if federal law governs
choice of law, say, on a federal claim, then federal law would
perform the choice unaffected by state views.243  Both proposi-
tions hold true whether the state or federal court was adopting
or applying the foreign law.
Adoption/application may have indirect effects on federal-
court practice, however.  Consider the important matter of
pleading and proof of foreign law.  It has undergone an evolu-
tion from treating the foreign law as a matter of fact to treating
it as a matter of law.  This change was not unrelated to the
issue of adoption versus application of foreign law.
State courts traditionally treated the law of sister states
and of foreign countries as “fact” to be pleaded and proved,
although relief from failure to do so sometimes came by a pre-
sumption that such outside law was the same as the forum’s.
The fact characterization often went to the extreme of leaving
the determination to the jury if there was a dispute on the
outside law’s content, and it considerably restricted appellate
241 See HAY ET AL., supra note 213, § 12.19, at 612–13; infra note 250. R
242 See supra text accompanying note 100. R
243 See supra text accompanying note 107. R
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review of the findings.  The situation was the same in federal
courts, except that the parties could rely on judicial notice of
the states’ laws.244
It was only in 1966 that Federal Rule 44.1 effected the
change from treatment as fact for foreign-nation law.245  The
parties no longer need to plead foreign-nation law, although
notice of raising it and some showing of its content must be
given.246  The judges have a new duty to inquire into the foreign
law, which makes much more sense now than it would if for-
eign law were still a matter of fact.
The change worked by Rule 44.1 appears to have followed
from the evolution from adoption to application.  Consider this
description of the former practice:
Courts dealing with a choice-of-law problem treated foreign
law not as law but as fact.  This meant that they merely consid-
ered the foreign law along with the other facts in the case and
gave it whatever effect it, as a fact, merited in any particular
case.  Local conflicts law at the forum actually controlled en-
forcement of claims based on extrastate facts.  Awareness of
this effect convinced some critics to conclude that there was no
such thing as a “foreign-created right” at all; no right came into
existence except as a court created it and declared it to exist
and rendered judgment accordingly.247
In the old days, then, local law was the only law applicable
to a case, and so foreign law was just a fact that the local court
244 See FIELD ET AL., supra note 38, at 1305–07. R
245 See FED R. CIV. P. 44.1; Arthur R. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact”
Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65
MICH. L. REV. 613, 617 (1967); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 5.10(2) (AM. LAW INST. Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2016) (“Ordinarily, the court
should aim to determine foreign law in light of how a court in the foreign state
would interpret and apply it.”); Doug M. Keller, Comment, Interpreting Foreign
Law Through an Erie Lens: A Critical Look at United States v. McNab, 40 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 157, 179–84 (2004) (arguing that the federal court should determine uncer-
tain foreign country law just as it decides the content of uncertain state law, by
surmising what the other sovereign’s highest court would say); cf. FELIX & WHIT-
TEN, supra note 219, § 84, at 272–74 (discussing Erie issues). R
246 See De Fontbrune v. Wofsy, 838 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding
that the district court may consider foreign legal materials, including expert testi-
mony and declarations, outside the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss);
Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetie`re, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 628–29 (7th Cir. 2010)
(questioning the propriety of relying on foreign-law experts); 9 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2447 (3d ed.
2008); cf. SOFIE GEEROMS, FOREIGN LAW IN CIVIL LITIGATION 392 (2004) (arguing
against any burden of proof as to foreign law).
247 FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 219, § 4, at 8 (footnote omitted); see id. § 83 R
(giving details of traditional practice).
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might treat as significant.248  At most, the local court would
treat the foreign law as significant enough under its law to
adopt as part of its solution.249  In the new days, foreign law
having come to be applied, parties and courts should deter-
mine the foreign law pretty much as they would local law.  That
is, it is more appropriately treated as a matter of law rather
than fact.
2. Effect on Choice of Law in State Court
The shift from adoption to application should similarly af-
fect how a state court determines and clarifies the content of
foreign law.  Gone should be the old oddities.250  The court
should now imagine itself in foreign shoes.
Yet, adoption versus application of foreign law does not
have a direct effect on federalism’s call for the proper line be-
tween state and federal law in the state courts.  State courts
will look to federal law sometimes under reverse-Erie’s preemp-
tion and choice of law.  But their behavior will be unaffected by
the adoption versus application distinction.
Again, in state courts the whole tradition of sister-state
and foreign-nation law as fact is now moving toward extinction.
They too have evolved from treating foreign law as a matter of
fact, which requires pleading and proof, to treating it as a mat-
ter of law.251
3. Modifiability of Other Sovereign’s Law
From the beginning, local interests could justify overriding
foreign law.  The idea was that public policy generated all law,
and so it should be able to shape or override law, whether
created at home or adopted from elsewhere.  “The public policy
of the forum is the basis for all of its law including its conflicts
248 See Ekelmans, supra note 175, at 271–72. R
249 See HAY ET AL., supra note 213, § 12.15, at 602 (“ ‘Law,’ in a strict territorial R
sense, comprises only the legal norms (statutory and decisional) that have binding
force in the court’s own territory.  A court, in this view, can only apply its own law.
Foreign ‘law’ thus is not ‘law,’ but, in situations having a requisite foreign connec-
tion, as determined by local law, constitutes a ‘fact’ like any other fact of the
case.”).
250 For example, in the pre-Erie days New York followed a Swift-like approach
that would look to sister-state statutes, but not to sister-state common law. See
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics,
and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21, 68 n.145
(Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008).
251 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5.10(1) (AM. LAW INST., Pre-
liminary Draft No. 2, 2016) (“The court is responsible for determining foreign
law.”); John G. Sprankling & George R. Lanyi, Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law
in American Courts, 19 STAN. J. INT’L L. 3, 5–9 (1983).
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of laws.”252  Early on, public policy expressed itself through the
exception of “substantial dissimilarity,” whereby an American
court would refuse to adopt a foreign law that was substantially
dissimilar to the local provision.253  This doctrine morphed into
the more discerning but still free-ranging judicial exception for
“public policy.”254
As the modern approach to choice of law has become more
functional and sensitive, one would expect a lessened role for
the public-policy exception to relieve unjust choice of law.
Moreover, as the approach to foreign law moved from adoption
to application, one would expect the greater respect for foreign
law to reduce the realm of the public-policy override.
However, one would not expect such overrides to disap-
pear.  The contraction of the exception would not be binary, or
on/off.  Moreover, in eschewing the public-policy exception, the
modern court does not necessarily blind itself to policy in the
course of bowing to the applied foreign law.  The local court
could override foreign law by invoking some other exception.255
Also, the court could play with the choice-of-law process to
avoid bringing over distasteful laws or parts of those laws, so
that in effect a public-policy exception would be built into the
choice of law itself.256
Consequently, public-policy overrides by courts today oc-
cur but are rare.  Public policy “is to be construed narrowly:
fundamental policies of the forum must be offended; mere dif-
ferences between the law of the forum and of the foreign juris-
diction are not enough.”257  The override requires viewing a
foreign system’s provision as “inherently vicious, wicked or im-
moral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense.”258  Very,
very rarely would another American law fall “so far outside the
pale of social, economic, and moral standards currently im-
posed by our civilization.”259
252 HERBERT F. GOODRICH & EUGENE F. SCOLES, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 14 (4th ed. 1964).
253 See FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 219, § 32, at 103–04. R
254 See HAY ET AL., supra note 213, § 3.15. R
255 See id. § 3.19 (discussing rare cases that refuse to apply foreign law be-
cause of lack of local judicial machinery or remedy).
256 See id. § 3.16; cf. FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 219, § 68, at 248–49 (arguing R
that the public-policy exception is therefore no longer necessary).  Interestingly,
one could say the same about the Erie doctrine: the vertical choice-of-law process
might take policy partly into account.
257 HAY ET AL., supra note 213, § 3.15, at 169. R
258 Intercont’l Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212 (N.Y. 1964).
259 FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 219, § 32, at 105. R
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Thus, the switch from adoption to application has
prompted American courts more fully to embrace sister-state
and foreign-nation law as it is.  Recognition of the move to
application might also affect a few of the classic problems of the
public-policy exception.  First, any argument that a public-pol-
icy rejection of the chosen foreign law should lead to the appli-
cation of domestic law becomes weaker.260  Today some might
even say, “Under no circumstances should a forum use public
policy to apply its own law on the merits.”261  Second, any
argument that the local court can strike down solely a defense
to a foreign claim on public-policy grounds should weaken.262
Again, some might say, “In no event should a neutral forum
invoke its own public policy to affect the result on the merits as
it would, for example, if it denied effect to a defense based on
obnoxious foreign law.”263  Third, arguments against de´pec¸age
start mounting when one invokes it so as to apply separate
sovereigns’ laws on related issues.  Such a technique would
result in an affront to the application of the foreign law.264
Another area in which the switch from adoption to applica-
tion might eventually be felt is in connection with how to han-
dle a foreign-generated correction, clarification, constriction, or
change of foreign law while the American action or appeal is
still pending.  If the American court is effectively applying for-
eign law, the law to be applied by it is the actual foreign law
260 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1971) (“The [public-policy exception] has a narrow scope of application.  It applies
only to situations where the forum refuses to entertain the suit on the ground that
the cause of action is contrary to a strong local public policy.  The rule does not
apply to situations where the forum does decide the controversy between the
parties and, on the stated ground of public policy, applies its own local law, rather
than the otherwise applicable law, in determining one or more of the issues
involved.”).
261 WEINTRAUB, supra note 227, § 3.6, at 124. R
262 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1971) (“The [public-policy exception] does not justify striking down a defense good
under the otherwise applicable law on the ground that this defense is contrary to
the strong public policy of the forum.  Such action involves more than a mere
denial of access to the court.  Rather, it is a preliminary step to the rendition of a
judgment on the merits.  It involves application of the local law of the forum to
determine the efficacy of a defense and thus to decide the ultimate rights of the
parties.  The Supreme Court of the United States has held that it is a violation of
due process for a State to strike down a defense under a foreign law as being
contrary to its public policy if the State has no reasonable relationship to the
transaction and the parties.  Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).”).
263 WEINTRAUB, supra note 227, § 3.6, at 122. R
264 See FELIX & WHITTEN, supra note 219, § 70, at 251 (arguing against R
“decoupling two laws of a state that are inextricably linked in a policy sense and
should be applied together”); WEINTRAUB, supra note 227, §§ 3.4–.5. R
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then prevailing, unless the foreign alteration was avowedly pro-
spective in effect.
4. Effect on Original Jurisdiction
Although plaintiffs do not have to, and most often do not,
specify the applicable law,265 the switch from adoption to appli-
cation means that now a plaintiff can assert a claim directly on
sister-state or foreign-nation law.  In state courts of general
jurisdiction, such a claim presents little theoretical problem.266
In federal courts, such a claim would obviously not support
federal question jurisdiction.  But a plaintiff could bring it
under supplemental jurisdiction pendent to a federal question
claim or under diversity or alienage jurisdiction.267  Federal
jurisdiction does not require a nonfederal claim to arise under
local state law.  The plaintiff would simply state the nonfederal
claim in the ordinary way and give notice under Rule 44.1 if
foreign-nation law was the basis of the claim.
A subtlety undiscussed elsewhere is which law would be
choosing to apply the sister-state or foreign-nation law on
which the plaintiff bases the suit.  It would be the forum state’s
choice-of-law rules.  Even for supplemental jurisdiction, the
same is presumably true.  Although the supplemental claim
has no connection to the forum state’s law, the federal court
should be conforming to what would be the forum state’s
result.268
The subtlety becomes more subtle when one hypothesizes
a federal statute properly giving federal question jurisdiction
but not providing the rule of decision, perhaps similar but not
identical to the Alien Tort Statute.269  What if the plaintiff in-
vokes the federal jurisdiction but permissibly sues under a
265 See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 101, § 8.04[3]. R
266 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016(e) (MCKINNEY 2017) (“Where a cause of action
or defense is based upon the law of a foreign country or its political subdivision,
the substance of the foreign law relied upon shall be stated.”).
267 See Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in
U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 887, 892–93 (2011).
268 See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975); Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
269 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  Because of various case-imposed limitations,
this problem is unlikely to arise under the Alien Tort Statute itself. E.g., Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013) (holding that the Alien Tort
Statute does not apply to “violations of the law of nations occurring outside the
United States”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004) (requiring that
claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute emanate from violations of “well
defined” norms of “customary international law”).
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foreign nation’s especially favorable law?270  The argument that
the federal court should then make its own choice of law be-
comes stronger, but still maybe not strong enough to justify
rejecting the forum state’s conflicts law.271  Entertaining the
foreign-law claim remains in the nature of jurisdiction supple-
mental to a possible federal question claim.
5. Effect on Appellate Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court can review any questions, state or fed-
eral or foreign, that arise in the lower federal courts.272  Adop-
tion versus application has no effect.
If a state were to adopt sister-state or foreign-nation law,
the Supreme Court would have no appellate jurisdiction over a
state court’s treatment of related issues.273  If a state were
instead to decide to apply sister-state or foreign-nation law, the
state case would likewise present no federal question support-
ing the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction; in the new era
of applying foreign law, no argument could prevail that the
applied foreign law had somehow become federal law.  By con-
trast, for federally adopted or applied law from a state or foreign
nation that raises issues in state court, the Supreme Court
would have appellate jurisdiction as usual.
IV
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR U.S. ACTORS
Compared to foreign law, the situation of international law
exhibits a reversed pattern.  People are used to thinking about
international law in terms of adoption versus application.  But
America has seen a shift from application to adoption, rather
than vice versa.
In the international law arena, the debate is phrased as the
choice between monist (application) and dualist (adoption) ap-
proaches.  The monist/dualist distinction is not altogether
270 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980) (envisaging
that Paraguayan law would apply and observing that the defendant “confuses the
question of federal jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, which requires con-
sideration of the law of nations, with the issue of the choice of law to be applied,
which will be addressed at a later stage in the proceedings”).
271 Cf. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941) (holding that Klaxon applies
even when the forum state court could not have entertained the action, such as a
statutory interpleader case).
272 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012).
273 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012).  Of course, a federal question could arise in
connection with applying the foreign law, such as the obligation to give full faith
and credit to a sister-state law.
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clear in theory, and practices tend to be mixed and flexible.274
Moreover, some consider the debate merely to be a matter of
civil law’s “high theory” located on “the glacial uplands of juris-
tic abstraction.”275
Nonetheless, something is here to be learned.  In the old
days, monism saw international law as applying of its own
force.  The general principles of international law, at least, were
considered part of natural law into the nineteenth century.276
Once natural law lost its bindingness, however, dualism was
destined to prevail broadly.  International law today mostly has
a part to play only after being adopted by national law.
A. Application of International Law
From natural law and from universalist notions of a world
society comes monism.  A monist state directly applies interna-
tional law qua international law.277  The monist view is that
international law is already part of the nation’s one legal order.
A party can invoke and a judge can apply international law,
just as if it were national law.  International law thus does not
need to be translated into national law.  It has effect automati-
cally.  Taking the appropriate steps under national law to join
an international treaty immediately incorporates the treaty into
the monist nation’s law.  Customary international law and gen-
eral principles of international law are treated as part of na-
tional law as well, although it could be that a monist nation
treats treaties and other international law differently.278
Monism does not necessarily imply that international law
is the supreme law, even if many casual commentators assume
it does.  That is, supremacy is not a marker of the monist/
dualist distinction correctly conceived.  Some monist states,
274 See Lando Kirchmair, The Theory of the Law Creators’ Circle: Re-conceptu-
alizing the Monism-Dualism-Pluralism Debate, 17 GERMAN L.J. 179, 180 (2016)
(“Current challenges . . . overburden these out-dated theories.”); cf. Gib van Ert,
Dubious Dualism: The Reception of International Law in Canada, 44 VAL. U. L. REV.
927, 928 (2010) (“Canada is neither dualist nor monist, but a hybrid of the two
models.”).
275 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 50
(8th ed. 2012).
276 See Stephen Hall, The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order
and the Limits of Legal Positivism, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 269, 270–73 (2001); William
J. Moon, The Original Meaning of the Law of Nations, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 51, 69–72
(2016).
277 See CRAWFORD, supra note 275, at 48–49. R
278 See id. at 55–56; Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Judicial Lawmaking,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
222, 227–28 (Catherine Bro¨lmann & Yannick Radi eds., 2016).
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like the Netherlands,279 do view international law as supreme.
There a judge could declare a national provision invalid be-
cause it contradicts international law.  Contradictory national
law is null and void, whether it pre- or post-dates the interna-
tional law, and even if it is constitutional in stature.  Other
monist states, like Germany,280 allow a later national statute to
override international law.  For example, treaties there have the
same effect as legislation and, by the principle of lex posterior
derogat legi priori, take precedence over legislation enacted
prior to their ratification but not over legislation enacted after
their ratification.
Neither does monism require a dinosaurian jurisprudence.
Rather than resurrecting natural law, one can turn to the mod-
ern idea of global constitutionalism.281  Compared to natural
law, this modern turn better poses the right questions, even if
its answers are just as subjective.  Global constitutionalism’s
idea would be that the peoples of the world, acting as the global
constituent powers, somehow consented in the creation of cer-
tain norms, which constitute international law and bind the
nonconsenting nation states.
Some commentators see the application of European
Union regulations by the member states as an example of ap-
plication of international law, somewhat in the monist tradi-
tion.282  A regulation is an EU legal act that becomes
immediately enforceable as law in all member states.  By con-
trast, one might more shakily view EU directives as acting in
the dualist tradition.  A directive is an EU legal act that sets out
a goal that all EU countries must implement by devising their
own laws.
But EU law is a poor example of international law.  True,
the acceptance of EU law by the member states and their peo-
ples resembles the acceptance of international law by treaty,
with each member state applying or adopting the original
279 See CONSTANTIJN A.J.M. KORTMANN & PAUL P.T. BOVEND’EERT, DUTCH CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW ¶¶ 442–47 (2000); PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUC-
TION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 67–68 (7th ed. 1997).
280 See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 164 (3d ed. 2013);
MALANCZUK, supra note 279, at 6 ,7 70. R
281 See generally JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITU-
TIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) (reassessing the evolution of interna-
tional law as a process of constitutionalization and providing a sketch of what a
constitutionalized world order could look like).
282 E.g., JU¨RGEN HABERMAS, THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 36–37 (Ciaran
Cronin trans., 2012); Neil Walker, Post-Constituent Constitutionalism? The Case of
the European Union, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 247 (Martin Loughlin &
Neil Walker eds., 2007).
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agreement and the subsequent EU law.  Nonetheless, the cur-
rent situation in Europe is better viewed as an application of
EU law by the member states in a manner similar to U.S.
states’ application of federal law under the reverse-Erie doc-
trine.283  Each member state has agreed to apply EU law, which
is supreme.
A more fruitful example of the application of international
law in the monist tradition is the treatment of international law
by the EU itself.  At least compared to the United States, the
EU’s own tradition is more monist:
Even while it has imposed conditions for the reception of
international treaties into the EU legal order, the European
Court nevertheless has continued to declare that interna-
tional treaties concluded by the EU or to which the EU has
succeeded are ‘an integral part’ of EU law.  Further, custom-
ary international law is regularly interpreted and applied by
the Court as an ‘integral part’ of EU law.
. . . The [US] Supreme Court links the internalization of
international law to congressional intent, whereas the CJEU
links it to a broader obligation on the EU to comply with
international law.  The Supreme Court’s judicial discourse on
the internalization of international law fits with a political
discourse on US sovereignty and independence within which
international law is understood as a voluntarily accepted in-
strument of US law and policy, while the CJEU’s fits with an
official EU discourse of the EU as a committed adherent to
and promoter of international law.284
The EU thus spoke in monist terms early on.  But one must
update that statement.  More recently, the CJEU has started to
take an approach increasingly similar to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s dualist approach.285
283 See Kevin M. Clermont, Book Review, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 258 (2009); see
also THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (Anna Nylund & Bart
Krans eds., 2016) (collecting articles that discuss the ways increasing Europeani-
zation has influenced the civil procedure systems of various EU members).
284 Gra´inne de Bu´rca, Internalization of International Law by the CJEU and the
US Supreme Court, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 987, 1005 (2015) (footnotes omitted).
285 See id. at 1003–04; Katja S. Ziegler, Beyond Pluralism and Autonomy:
Systemic Harmonization as a Paradigm for the Interaction of EU Law and Interna-
tional Law, 35 Y.B. EUR. L. 667 (2016) (arguing for systematic harmonization as
an antidote for the CJEU’s increasing stress on autonomy).
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B. Adoption of International Law
Today dualism is the more common approach.286  For ex-
amples, it prevails in the United Kingdom287 and the United
States.288  Dualists emphasize the difference between national
and international law by drawing on notions of positivism and
sovereignty.  They require the adoption of international law into
national law.289  Without this adoption, international law does
not exist as law.  To accept international law as binding with-
out adoption would involve too direct an assault on positivism
and too great a sacrifice of sovereignty.
Accordingly, under dualism, national judges never apply
international law.  They apply only national law, which may
have adopted international law:
International law as such can confer no rights cognizable in
the municipal Courts.  It is only in so far as the rules of
international law are recognized as included in the rules of
the municipal law that they are allowed in the municipal
Courts to give rise to rights or obligations.290
If one wants international law to bind of its own force, or to
bind after adoption is withdrawn, one must resort to some
residue of monism.  Thus, few in the United States argue that
international law applies here.291  Indeed, not many push
adopting it when it is contrary to U.S. law or even to U.S.
interests.
Here, adoption only “occurs when an international norm is
incorporated into the domestic legal system and becomes do-
mestic law through executive action, legislative action, judicial
interpretation, or some combination of the three.”292  First,
286 See MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 (7th ed. 2016).
287 See MALANCZUK, supra note 279, at 69. R
288 See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (describing our “dualist jurisprudence”); JANIS, supra note 286, at R
88.
289 See CRAWFORD, supra note 275, at 48. R
290 Commercial & Estates Co. of Egypt v. Bd. of Trade, [1925] 1 KB 271 (CA)
295.
291 See, e.g., Young, supra note 229, at 34 n.41 (arguing that, in the United R
States, “international law never applied ‘of its own force’”). But see Louis Henkin,
International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1561–62
(1984) (“Unlike federal common law, customary international law is not made and
developed by the federal courts independently and in the exercise of their own
law-making judgment.  In a real sense federal courts find international law rather
than make it . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
292 Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV.
623, 642 (1998); see Mark A. Pollack, Who Supports International Law, and Why?:
The United States, the European Union, and the International Legal Order, 13 INT’L
J. CONST. L. 873, 882 (2015).
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treaties are a way to adopt international law into U.S. law.
Unlike executive agreements, which are adopted by the execu-
tive branch, treaties do not automatically come into effect upon
signing.  Treaties need to be adopted by Congress, sometimes
merely by ratification but usually also by implementing legisla-
tion.293  A later federal statute can override an executive agree-
ment or a treaty.294  Second, the legislature can adopt
international law.  But of course a later statute can override
that international law.  Third, American courts can adopt inter-
national law, either expressly or through interpretation of al-
ready adopted international law.295  Courts will not normally
adopt international law that is contrary to local law or inter-
ests, and later local law can override adopted international
law.296  In sum, executive agreements, treaties, customary in-
ternational law, and probably even general principles of inter-
national law govern only to the extent that domestic lawmakers
choose to adopt them.297
Another way to express the idea of adoption is that the
binding effect of international law under dualism results only
from and to the extent of national consent.298  Consent, or
293 See Medellı´n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–06 (2008); CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 145, § 3.6.1, at 291–93; DAVID L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY R
(2016).
294 See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A
Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 320 (1992).
295 See, e.g., Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 137 S. Ct. 1504 (2017) (holding that
the Hague Service Convention did not prohibit service of process by mail, looking
in part to the Convention’s subsequent interpretations).
296 See ROBERT KOLB, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (2016) (“In reality,
municipal organs apply municipal law first and foremost, and are more sensitive
to the interests of their State than to remote or sometimes lofty international
interests.”).
297 See Medellı´n, 552 U.S. at 520–21; Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v.
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935–36 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  Courts can look to international
law in connection with various so-called interpretive incorporation techniques,
such as by looking at unratified international human rights treaties in interpret-
ing national law.  But this use is a weaker effect of international law, not a form of
application or even adoption. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (AM. LAW INST. 1987); JANIS, supra note 286, at 117–19; R
cf. Tzanakopoulos, supra note 278, at 227–29 (discussing other weak effects of R
international law on domestic law, such as an implicit feedback loop between
international law and the general principles that a court invokes); supra text
accompanying note 174. But see Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judi- R
cial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 628 (2007) (discussing a judicial shift to monism with respect to interna-
tional human rights treaties).
298 See Clayton P. Gillette & Steven D. Walt, Judicial Refusal to Apply Treaty
Law: Domestic Law Limitations on the CISG’s Application, 22 UNIFORM L. REV. 452
(2017); Hall, supra note 276, at 282–84; cf. Wouter G. Werner, State Consent as R
Foundational Myth, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNA-
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voluntarism, is a powerful notion.  It can provide a route for a
dualist state to assume some of the trappings of monism, while
remaining essentially dualist.  First, a dualist state could revo-
cably consent to a delegation of lawmaking power to interna-
tional authorities.299  The state could thereby enact a rule
providing that changes in international law will have automatic
effect.  Second, the dualist state could revocably consent even
to international law being supreme over the remainder of na-
tional law.  Nonsupremacy is not a marker of the dualist/mon-
ist boundary line.
C. Practical Implications
The differences between monist (application) and dualist
(adoption) approaches certainly would affect how one conceives
of international law.  Is it a real thing already applicable locally
or is it more a set of ideas and norms that the local law can
draw on?  Take for example Hans Kelsen, the most prominent
theorist of monism.300  For him, “[i]nternational and national
law form a single system of norms because they receive their
validity from the same source,” which he called the
Grundnorm.301 So for him, international law should apply of its
own force, co-equal with national law.
If that difference seems a bit lofty, there is also the obvious
difference that dualism requires the extra step of the national
law incorporating international law.  The nation must expressly
accept the international provision.  But this difference may be
more formal than real.  Even a monist state must take some
steps to put an executive agreement or a treaty into force.  Like-
wise, the monist legislature may enact and the monist court
may enforce the international law, with the only real difference
from dualism being that it views itself as applying rather than
adopting international law.  In other words, this difference
reduces to how the state conceives of international law as a
matter of theory.
Accordingly, some commentators consider the monism/
dualism debate as a bit of outdated theory that is not terribly
important anymore.  They are willing to leave the debate up in
TIONAL LAWMAKING 13 (Catherine Bro¨lmann & Yannick Radi eds., 2016) (stressing
the limits of consent as the foundational idea for all of international law).
299 See Dorf, supra note 16, at 105–06; Tzanakopoulos, supra note 278, at 227 R
(“[I]t is the domestic legal system that regulates the reception of international law
into domestic law, even if it does so in an international law-friendly manner . . . .”).
300 See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553–88 (Robert W.
Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966).
301 CRAWFORD, supra note 275, at 49. R
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the air.  “It is more useful to leave this dogmatic dispute aside”
and look to practice.302  They end up in a place like this:
In fact legal systems are experienced by those who work
within them as having relative autonomy (how much auton-
omy depends on the power and disposition of each system,
and varies over time).  The only theory which can adequately
account for that fact is some form of pluralism. . . .  [E]ach
system reserves to itself the authority to determine for the
time being the extent and terms of interpenetration of
laws . . . .303
Yet, how the state conceives of international law can have
real effect.  For example, customary international law gets es-
tablished by showing (1) commonly established state practice
and (2) the states’ sense that they are bound by the law (opinio
juris).304  The states would have to be applying the custom,
rather than adopting it, to satisfy the requirement of opinio
juris.  So the conception of the law affects the generation of
international law.
The difference between applying and adopting in the three
other settings surveyed above proved to have practical effects.
It should be worth comparably running through the other po-
tential practical differences if international law were applied
rather than adopted.
1. Effect on Choice of Law in Federal Court
Adoption versus application of international law will affect
the degree of deference to international authorities in deter-
mining the content of the international law.  But the distinction
will not have a direct effect on federalism.  On the one hand, on
issues governed by state law under Erie, a federal court would
follow whatever the state would do with respect to international
law.  On the other hand, if federal law governs, say, on a federal
claim, then federal law would turn to international law when-
ever deemed appropriate by federal authority.  Both proposi-
tions hold true whether the state or federal actor was adopting
or applying the international law.
Of course, the split between state and federal law in the
realm of foreign relations is a difficult, complicated, and odd
one.  Although there is considerable federal control over this
302 MALANCZUK, supra note 279, at 64. R
303 CRAWFORD, supra note 275, at 50 (footnote omitted). R
304 See JANIS, supra note 286, at 48–50. R
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realm,305 the states are certainly not excluded from interna-
tional matters.306  Indeed, an argument for dualism in the
United States is that the federalism situation is so confusing
that we should require affirmative adoption before interna-
tional law comes to govern on the state or the federal level.
Even where federal law should govern after an Erie/
Clearfield analysis, there may be a separation-of-powers debate
as to whether it is for a federal court to act as lawmaker by
adopting international law.307  Regardless, today in the United
States, it is only adoption that is being argued about.  The
argument is not over whether the federal court should decide
that international law applies by its own force, but only over
305 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423–24 (1964)
(adopting the act-of-state doctrine as a matter of federal common law); 19 WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 102, § 4517, at 781–86 (describing the unclear extent of federal R
power).
306 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that
state law can govern horizontal choice of law); John Norton Moore, Federalism
and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 265 (saying that state law can govern
reciprocity in recognition of foreign-nation judgments). But cf. Daniel C.K. Chow,
Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of
International Choice of Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 165 (1988) (arguing against the rule
that state law can govern international choice of law); John D. Brummett, Jr.,
Note, The Preclusive Effect of Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States and
Federal Choice of Law: The Role of the Erie Doctrine Reassessed, 33 N.Y. L. SCH. L.
REV. 83 (1988) (arguing against the rule that state law can govern recognition of
foreign-nation judgments).
307 See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 50, at 702–22 (discussing the is- R
sues surrounding judicial adoption of international law).  The attack on the pre-
vailing view of the federal courts’ power to adopt international law as federal
common law is led by Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary Interna-
tional Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 815 (1997) (arguing against status of customary international law as
federal common law).  They base their argument on the implications of Erie with
regard to the federal courts’ power to create federal law without congressional
authorization.  I disagree on their reading of Erie and on their reading of the many
cases incorporating customary international law into federal law. See Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628 (2006) (shaping law of war); Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–28 (2004) (upholding federal courts’ power to recog-
nize certain claims under the law of nations as federal common law); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520–21 (2004) (plurality opinion) (shaping law of war);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 reporters’ note 3 (AM. LAW
INST. 1987); FALLON ET AL., supra note 50, at 714–15; William S. Dodge, Customary R
International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 19
(2007) (arguing against a view of positivism that would require adoption by a
political branch); cf. Young, supra note 229, at 34–35 (arguing that federal courts R
can adopt customary international law, similarly to how they apply foreign law).
Also, their approach would make it impossible for federal courts to formulate
federal choice-of-law rules for federal question cases and much other federal
common law.  The federal courts can properly adopt international law as part of
the pattern of U.S. courts looking to general law to make common law.  See Caleb
Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2006).
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the extent to which a federal court on its own can adopt inter-
national law as federal common law.
2. Effect on Choice of Law in State Court
Similarly, adoption versus application of international law
affects the degree of deference to international authorities by
state courts.  But the distinction does not have a direct effect
on federalism’s call for the proper line between state and fed-
eral law in the state courts.  State courts will look to federal law
sometimes under reverse-Erie.  But their behavior will be unaf-
fected by the adoption/application distinction.
3. Modifiability of Other Sovereign’s Law
Under this heading—the nation’s creation of exceptions
that allow modifying or ignoring international law—is where
the biggest difference between adopting and applying should
play out.  National interests can much more readily override
international law if the legal actor sees international law as
merely something possibly to be adopted, rather than as apply-
ing of its own force.  Admittedly, any nation’s lawmakers would
be able to find a way for its interests to override international
law, except perhaps in the purest monist regime.  But every-
where the difference between application and adoption would
have a real effect in the national courts.  If international law
already applies, the court would have to treat it as part of the
law of the land.  If the court were instead considering whether
to adopt international law, then contrary local law and inter-
ests could defeat the adoption at the outset.  Given the dualist
jurisprudence in the United States,308 we would not expect
here, nor do we see, a great subservience to international
law309 or to decisions of international tribunals.310
The switch from application to adoption in U.S. jurispru-
dence might also be felt in connection with how to handle an
internationally generated correction, clarification, constriction,
or change of international law while an appeal in an American
case is pending.  Because the American court is adopting inter-
308 See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
309 See David H. Moore, Constitutional Commitment to International Law Com-
pliance?, 102 VA. L. REV. 367, 368 (2016) (arguing that constitutional history
supports “national discretion to violate international law”).  But see Jordan J.
Paust, Actual Commitment to Compliance with International Law and Subsequent
Supreme Court Opinions: A Reply to Professor Moore, 39 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 57 (2017)
(questioning the existence of an early historical basis for the current approach).
310 See Medellı´n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 520–21 (2008).
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national law, it is hard to imagine that the supervening altera-
tion in adopted law would affect the appeal’s outcome.  No case
law exists on the point, however.  The fact is that the monism/
dualism debate seems not to have attracted the attention of
American courts.311
4. Effect on Original Jurisdiction
The switch from application to adoption affects original
jurisdiction.  In a dualist country like the United States, a party
could not found original jurisdiction directly on international
law.312  But given state or federal law adopting international
law, original jurisdiction could lie under the usual rules for
state and federal claims.  In state courts of general jurisdiction,
such a claim presents little theoretical problem.  In federal
courts, a claim based on federally adopted international law
would support federal question jurisdiction.313  Thus, jurisdic-
tion for a federal claim under the Alien Tort Statute314 exists by
virtue of the federal common law adopting the law of
nations.315
5. Effect on Appellate Jurisdiction
The switch from application to adoption affects appellate
jurisdiction in a similar way.  The Supreme Court can review
any questions, state or federal, that arise in the lower federal
courts.316  Federally adopted international law will present a
federal question supporting the Supreme Court’s appellate ju-
risdiction over state courts.317
D. Juristic Pluralism Revisited
As already suggested,318 adopting vs. applying another
source of law expresses the local sovereign’s approach to a
311 The only American case to have employed the monist and dualist terminol-
ogy is Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
312 See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzˇic´, 70 F.3d 232, 238, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (indicat-
ing that a suit for international law violations must rest on federal law that adopts
the international law).
313 See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 62–70 (5th ed. 2011).
314 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
315 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–28 (2004) (upholding
federal courts’ power to recognize certain claims under the law of nations as
federal common law).
316 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012).
317 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012).
318 See supra text accompanying note 31. R
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pluralist world.  Does all law come from the local sovereign as a
single validating source or do multiple sources of law have a
claim to governing human behavior?
Pluralism posits multiple legal systems having some force
within one population or area.  The theory emerged through
study of colonial societies, but now operates in a much wider
and more fluid realm.319  Once contemplated, and then ac-
cepted as a fact on the ground, the theory will tend to under-
mine the notion of law as embodying one formally positive legal
order or even one coherently unified legal system.320
Federalism, in a sense, is the ultimate in juristic plural-
ism.321  The definition of federalism is a governmental system
by which its people live under the authority of more than one
sovereign.  “The Framers split the atom of sovereignty.”322  To
maintain such a system, there must be some zone of constitu-
tionally entrenched decentralized power, where the constitutive
sovereign can act without being subject to the central sover-
eign’s override.  There must also be a zone where the central
sovereign reigns supreme.  It is those zones that permit us to
speak of there being more than one sovereign in place.  As a
consequence, application by each sovereign of the co-sover-
eign’s law has a big role to play.  Still, a voluntary role for
adoption remains, deployed in the spirit of cooperative
federalism.
Extending the theory of this national pluralism to global
pluralism,323 we first encounter horizontal choice of law.  Adop-
tion worked as a means of recognizing foreign law, while ab-
sorbing it into the local law as the single validating source of
law.  The modern move to application represents the acknowl-
edgment that foreign law has a claim to govern directly.  In the
United States, we see a growing acceptance of a pluralist world,
as we have evolved from adoption to application of foreign law.
Coming to the subject of international law, the United
States seems to have taken a different path, one that goes
toward rather than away from state-centered jurisprudence.  In
319 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present,
Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 381–86 (2008).
320 See Margaret Davies, Legal Pluralism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL RESEARCH 805, 806–09 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010).
321 See id. at 818 (defining juristic, or weak, pluralism as the situation where a
statist authority acknowledges another normative system only if it clearly is “law”
already).
322 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
323 See Tamanaha, supra note 319, at 386–89. R
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the old days, monist American courts applied international
law, while today the solidly dualist courts require adoption of
international law.  That evolution looks like a divergence from
the path of horizontal choice of law.  However, this divergence
of international law is an illusion.
In the very old days of our system—the days of custom,
church, guilds, boroughs, merchants, lords, and kings—a jum-
ble of pluralism was the internal norm.324  Only with the rise of
the nation-state in seventeenth-century Western Europe did
statist thinking emerge, along with its consolidation of law.325
Foreign law was often left outside the ramparts, despite any
justice values that called for recognizing it.  Later, national self-
interest in reciprocally recognizing each other’s laws became
apparent.326  Increasing legal instrumentalism in the face of
increasing interactions with other countries encouraged a
more pluralist outlook on horizontal choice of law.  This out-
look countenanced adopting other sovereigns’ laws and, much
later, applying those laws.
International law, however, could initially weather the rise
of nation-states by remaining internal within each nation-
state’s own law.  Natural law and universalism enshrined it and
called for it to apply directly.  That early practice might look
pluralist to us, yet in fact the practice was not at all pluralist.
The nation-state was applying its own law.  The very term
“monism” itself belies pluralism and proclaims statism.  Later,
as the theoretical foundation of monism weakened in the nine-
teenth century, sacrifice of sovereignty at the altar of interna-
tionalism did not obviously serve self-interest.  Dualism and its
adoption of law seemed more than enough of a generous con-
cession.  Only still later, the disasters of the twentieth century
perhaps induced us to see a possible role for the United States
as a leader in the embrace of internationalism, a role that
might serve self-interest and more surely would serve
humanity.327
324 See Davies, supra note 320, at 807–08. R
325 See Tamanaha, supra note 319, at 377–81.  “The key characteristic” that R
non-statist law “lost over time was their former, equal standing and autonomous
legal status” as “independently applicable bodies of law.” Id. at 381.
326 See Timothy Endicott, Comity Among Authorities, 68 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
1 (2015); cf. Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in
the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 416 (1999) (analyzing
recognition as an iterative prisoner’s dilemma game).
327 See SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 24–30 (2d ed. 2012)
(tracing the history of U.S. interaction with international law).
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Thus, the motion toward dualism did not present a rejec-
tion of pluralist application of law, but only a rejection of mon-
ism.  Because the discarding of natural law and universalism
awaited the nineteenth century, and because U.S. aspirations
for internationalism awaited the twentieth century, the youth-
ful idea of dualism and its adoption of international law remain
in place.  But perhaps today’s dualism is a waystation on the
road to application of international law.  The future might see,
once again, more application of international law, and this time
as a true expression of pluralism.328
E. Treatment of Nonsovereign Law
An arguable reason to follow a dualist approach is that no
ordinary sovereign stands behind international law.  As a re-
sult, some more traditional sovereign needs to adopt it for it to
have force.  But there is in fact already a sovereign of sorts
behind international law.  The international community of na-
tions, deciding on legal norms, acts as a quasi-sovereign.329
Moreover, the absence of a usual sovereign behind law is
not determinative.  Native Americans have a complicated sort
of sovereignty.330  Nonetheless, their laws receive treatment
like a U.S. sister state’s law for choice-of-law purposes.331  That
is, federal and state courts apply tribal law.332
328 See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 889
(1988) (observing that the pluralist “perspective requires a shift away from an
essentialist definition of law to an historical understanding since any situation of
legal pluralism develops over time through the dialectic between legal systems,
each of which both constitutes and reconstitutes the other in some way”).
329 See JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2015) (looking
to “the general will of the world’s peoples, mediated through the decision-making
procedure of each state as it participates in the formation of international legal
rules”); Stephan, supra note 24, at 4–5 & n.12. R
330 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Dualism and the Dialogic of Incorporation in
Federal Indian Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 28, 30 (2005) (“In previous writings,
I have argued that one of the reasons for the Court’s anti-tribal decisions was its
refusal to include tribes in its federalism jurisprudence under a third sphere of
sovereignty.”).
331 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 7.06[2], at 656 (Nell Jessup
Newton ed., 2012) (“Application of choice-of-law principles will sometimes lead
state and federal courts to apply tribal law to disputes arising in Indian country.”);
cf. id. § 7.06[1] (describing similar choice of law by tribal courts).
332 See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 29–32 (1899) (applying tribal probate
law); Katherine J. Florey, Choosing Tribal Law: Why State Choice-of-Law Principles
Should Apply to Disputes with Tribal Contacts, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1627 (2006)
(arguing for acceptance of applying tribal law); Craig Smith, Comment, Full Faith
and Credit in Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition of Tribal Court Decisions Revisited,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1393 (2010) (arguing for the position that tribes are “territories”
within the federal full faith and credit statute); cf., e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1903(2), 1911(d) (2012) (applying tribal law by statute).
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Still, the absence of a usual sovereign means that the dual-
ist analysis of international law easily carries over to “non-
sovereign” law, such as custom or religion.  Dualist analysis
extends as well to matter that further stretches the concept of
“law,”333 such as private regulatory codes.334  Therefore,
whatever we include as nonsovereign law (excluding interna-
tional and tribal law), it is likely that American law would at
most adopt it in a dualist way, and not apply it.335
Occasional pluralists push back here against such “legal
centralism,” arguing that nonsovereign law could apply of its
own force.336  Oftentimes their view seems unrealistic or, at the
least, leads to conceptual problems.337  In other words, as long
as adoption or application of law is being directed by a statist
authority, championing the application of nonsovereign law as
opposed to its adoption normally is not a promising theoretical
avenue to follow.338  Yet sometimes a sovereign’s treatment of
nonsovereign law does look a lot like application.  An example,
one with which this Article began, might be a sovereign’s fol-
lowing the bar’s rules of professional conduct: some sovereigns
appear to have created an internal directive that the bar’s rules
actually govern.339
CONCLUSION
The basic distinction between applying and adopting an-
other sovereign’s law is of primary importance to a legal sys-
tem’s rules for external recognition of another legal order.  No
doubt, differences exist as to how application and adoption
work out in federal and state relations, on the one hand, and in
the settings of horizontal choice of law and international law,
on the other hand.  Yet in the main, the distinction’s signifi-
333 See Michaels, supra note 28, at 95–97; cf. Frank J. Garcia, Law and R
Globalization: Conceptual Issues (TLI Think! Paper, No. 33/2016, 2016), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2834299 [https://perma.cc/925Z-MXWS] (considering
“transnational law” and “global law”).
334 See Michaels, supra note 28, at 92–93; Frederick Schauer, Law’s Bounda- R
ries, 131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017–2018), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2871723 [https://perma.cc/8J96-B7DR].
335 See Nelson, supra note 307, at 505. R
336 See Griffiths, supra note 30, at 5–8. R
337 See Michaels, supra note 28, at 97–99, 114–15. R
338 See Tamanaha, supra note 319, at 411 (“State law is in a unique symbolic R
and institutional position that derives from the fact that it is state law—the state
holds a unique (domestic and international) position in the contemporary political
order.”).
339 See supra text accompanying note 34. R
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cance holds regardless of the setting.  Across the board, the
distinction shapes our approach to a pluralist world.
First, in the Erie setting, for federal actors, a certain state’s
law can apply of its own force.  By contrast, when federal law is
to govern but there is no extant federal law, the federal actor
may adopt state law as federal law, incorporating it by refer-
ence.  The status of adoption carries with it all sorts of practical
implications.  The most obvious implications are that the fed-
eral lawmaker can let federal interests guide which state’s law
to adopt and how much of it to adopt.
Second, in the reverse-Erie setting, a state often must ap-
ply existing federal law under the command of the Supremacy
Clause.  This result may follow from preemption or from a fed-
erally imposed judicial-choice-of-law.  By contrast, the state
might choose to adopt federal law as state law even in the
absence of such compulsion.  A state statute might gratui-
tously incorporate federal tax definitions, for example.  Here
the consequences of adoption, as opposed to application, in-
clude that the federal courts will lack original jurisdiction to
consider the matters of adopted federal law, even though the
U.S. Supreme Court retains some appellate jurisdiction to re-
view them.
Third, as to horizontal choice of law, over time the domi-
nant U.S. approach evolved from adoption of the foreign law
into local law, in the name of comity, to recognition that the
foreign law had a claim to its own application, via some sort of
pluralist impulse.  One result of this move toward application
was to constrain the power of the local court to override the
foreign law, and another result was to empower the parties to
sue and defend directly on the basis of the foreign law.
Fourth, as to the status of international law, the evolution
appears to have gone in the opposite direction.  Over time the
dominant U.S. approach went from application of international
law, in the name of natural law, to adoption of international
law, via a positivist outlook.  A result of this move toward adop-
tion was to subordinate international law and so further sub-
ject it to national override.
The applying/adoption distinction emerges undeniably
from a study of the federalism settings.  When one searches for
that distinction in the other settings of a sovereign’s looking to
another’s law, one perceives a sharp drop in deference when
going from current U.S. treatment of a foreign sovereign’s law
to our international-law/nonsovereign-law constructs.  In fact,
application and adoption do not have the exact same extent or
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effect in all four settings.  The dividing line between them can
shift if not fade, and their binary implications can differ some-
what in each setting.  On the ground, the binariness in the
different effects of application/adoption is more pronounced in
the Erie and reverse-Erie settings than in horizontal choice of
law and especially in international law.
Still, throughout all the settings, a focus on the applying/
adoption distinction clarifies the theory of external recognition.
The distinction also makes the practical consequences that are
already enshrined in doctrine—the federalist implications for
federal and state courts, the bindingness of the other’s law, and
the local availability of original and appellate jurisdiction—
much more comprehensible.  The reason is that the essence of
the distinction between application and adoption stays the
same across settings.  Application means recognizing that by
its proper reach the other sovereign’s law governs under its
own force, while adoption means voluntary consultation of the
other sovereign’s law in formulating the local rule of decision
for reasons of fairness, convenience, or other local policies.
This essential distinction is the instructive one.
